Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information

<p>This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.</p>

Author dc:creator

• Wang, Shouqiang

Advisors dc:contributor.advisor

• Belloni, Alexandre
• Lopomo, Giuseppe

• Business

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/5652

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dukespace.lib.duke.edu:10161/5652