This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Wang, Shouqiang"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Belloni, Alexandre","Lopomo, Giuseppe"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011","date_published":"2011","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:07:12Z","subjects":["Business"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10161/5652","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Belloni, Alexandre","Lopomo, Giuseppe"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Wang, Shouqiang"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2012-05-29T16:41:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2012-05-29T16:41:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2011"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Business"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10161/5652"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Belloni, Alexandre","Lopomo, Giuseppe"],"dc:creator":["Wang, Shouqiang"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2012-05-29T16:41:21Z"],"dc:date.available":["2012-05-29T16:41:21Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2011"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.
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