Contracting in Direct Asset Sales

<p>Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of direct asset sales agreements in the SEC filings, I provide the first large-sample evidence on how contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate information frictions in these important transactions. The conflict of interests is unique because the scarcity of asset-specific financial information makes target assets difficult to value and monitor, especially when such transactions are usually consummated in a short period. I first show an extensive use of representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements in these contracts when severe information asymmetry exists between buyers and sellers. Importantly, further results suggest that these contracting mechanisms tend to be used jointly rather than as substitutes for one another. A robust test based on the adoption of SFAS 141(R) provides strong evidence on such complementarity. Additional tests also suggest a significant relation between covenants and contract duration. Overall, my study provides novel evidence on direct asset sales’ contracting mechanisms and their relationships.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Business

Grantor

The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

Year dc:date.available

2021

Author dc:creator

• Yuan, Xin

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Edward Xuejun Li

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Masako Darrough
• Xi Dong
• Monica Neamtiu

• Accounting
• Contracts
• Corporate Finance
• Direct Asset Sales
• Information Frictions
• Contracting Mechanisms
• Representations and Warranties
• Complementarity

Repository record dc:identifier

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4326

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:academicworks.cuny.edu:gc_etds-5443