Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of direct asset sales agreements in the SEC filings, I provide the first large-sample evidence on how contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate information frictions in these important transactions. The conflict of interests is unique because the scarcity of asset-specific financial information makes target assets difficult to value and monitor, especially when such transactions are usually consummated in a short period. I first show an extensive use of representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements in these contracts when severe information asymmetry exists between buyers and sellers. Importantly, further results suggest that these contracting mechanisms tend to be used jointly rather than as substitutes for one another. A robust test based on the adoption of SFAS 141(R) provides strong evidence on such complementarity. Additional tests also suggest a significant relation between covenants and contract duration. Overall, my study provides novel evidence on direct asset sales’ contracting mechanisms and their relationships.
","abstract_html":"<p>Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of direct asset sales agreements in the SEC filings, I provide the first large-sample evidence on how contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate information frictions in these important transactions. The conflict of interests is unique because the scarcity of asset-specific financial information makes target assets difficult to value and monitor, especially when such transactions are usually consummated in a short period. I first show an extensive use of representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements in these contracts when severe information asymmetry exists between buyers and sellers. Importantly, further results suggest that these contracting mechanisms tend to be used jointly rather than as substitutes for one another. A robust test based on the adoption of SFAS 141(R) provides strong evidence on such complementarity. Additional tests also suggest a significant relation between covenants and contract duration. Overall, my study provides novel evidence on direct asset sales’ contracting mechanisms and their relationships.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Yuan, Xin"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Business","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Edward Xuejun Li"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Masako Darrough","Xi Dong","Monica Neamtiu"],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2021-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:59:38Z","subjects":["Accounting","Contracts","Corporate Finance","Direct Asset Sales","Information Frictions","Contracting Mechanisms","Representations and Warranties","Complementarity"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4326","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Edward Xuejun Li"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Masako Darrough","Xi Dong","Monica Neamtiu"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Yuan, Xin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-05-12T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Business"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Accounting","Contracts","Corporate Finance","Direct Asset Sales","Information Frictions","Contracting Mechanisms","Representations and Warranties","Complementarity"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4326"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of direct asset sales agreements in the SEC filings, I provide the first large-sample evidence on how contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate information frictions in these important transactions. The conflict of interests is unique because the scarcity of asset-specific financial information makes target assets difficult to value and monitor, especially when such transactions are usually consummated in a short period. I first show an extensive use of representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements in these contracts when severe information asymmetry exists between buyers and sellers. Importantly, further results suggest that these contracting mechanisms tend to be used jointly rather than as substitutes for one another. A robust test based on the adoption of SFAS 141(R) provides strong evidence on such complementarity. Additional tests also suggest a significant relation between covenants and contract duration. Overall, my study provides novel evidence on direct asset sales’ contracting mechanisms and their relationships.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Contracting in Direct Asset Sales"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Edward Xuejun Li"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Masako Darrough","Xi Dong","Monica Neamtiu"],"dc:creator":["Yuan, Xin"],"dc:date.available":["2021-05-12T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of direct asset sales agreements in the SEC filings, I provide the first large-sample evidence on how contracting mechanisms are used to mitigate information frictions in these important transactions. The conflict of interests is unique because the scarcity of asset-specific financial information makes target assets difficult to value and monitor, especially when such transactions are usually consummated in a short period. I first show an extensive use of representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements in these contracts when severe information asymmetry exists between buyers and sellers. Importantly, further results suggest that these contracting mechanisms tend to be used jointly rather than as substitutes for one another. A robust test based on the adoption of SFAS 141(R) provides strong evidence on such complementarity. Additional tests also suggest a significant relation between covenants and contract duration. Overall, my study provides novel evidence on direct asset sales’ contracting mechanisms and their relationships.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4326"],"dc:subject":["Accounting","Contracts","Corporate Finance","Direct Asset Sales","Information Frictions","Contracting Mechanisms","Representations and Warranties","Complementarity"],"dc:title":["Contracting in Direct Asset Sales"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Business"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:59:38Z"}