Fighting Words: Slurs, Semantics, and the Law

<p>Oppressive slurs like the n-word are fighting words <em>par excellence</em>. Their power to incite conflict and inflict emotional injury is unmatched by that of other, more commonplace insults. But what is it that makes oppressive slurs such potent verbal weapons? A commonplace view among both philosophers and legal theorists is that slurs make such potent insults because their uses convey extremely offensive, bigoted <em>attitudes</em>. This dissertation argues that this view is mistaken, and that its falsity has important implications for hate speech jurisprudence. I argue that, to grasp what makes slurs such potent verbal weapons, we ought conceive of them not only as tools for expression, but also as tools for a sadly neglected use of language that I term the <em>ballistic use </em>of language. I argue that, like a burning cross, or a swastika spray painted across a synagogue’s doors, an oppressive slur like the n-word is best understood as a tool for the infliction of traumatic associations on members of its target group.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

Year dc:date.available

2021

Author dc:creator

• Stillman, Richard

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Stephen R. A. Neale

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Michael Devitt
• Gary Ostertag
• David Papineau

• Philosophy of Language
• Semantics and Pragmatics
• Slurs
• Associations
• Free Speech
• Reappropriation
• Use-Mention Distinction

Repository record dc:identifier

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4287

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:academicworks.cuny.edu:gc_etds-5351