Oppressive slurs like the n-word are fighting words par excellence. Their power to incite conflict and inflict emotional injury is unmatched by that of other, more commonplace insults. But what is it that makes oppressive slurs such potent verbal weapons? A commonplace view among both philosophers and legal theorists is that slurs make such potent insults because their uses convey extremely offensive, bigoted attitudes. This dissertation argues that this view is mistaken, and that its falsity has important implications for hate speech jurisprudence. I argue that, to grasp what makes slurs such potent verbal weapons, we ought conceive of them not only as tools for expression, but also as tools for a sadly neglected use of language that I term the ballistic use of language. I argue that, like a burning cross, or a swastika spray painted across a synagogue’s doors, an oppressive slur like the n-word is best understood as a tool for the infliction of traumatic associations on members of its target group.
","abstract_html":"<p>Oppressive slurs like the n-word are fighting words <em>par excellence</em>. Their power to incite conflict and inflict emotional injury is unmatched by that of other, more commonplace insults. But what is it that makes oppressive slurs such potent verbal weapons? A commonplace view among both philosophers and legal theorists is that slurs make such potent insults because their uses convey extremely offensive, bigoted <em>attitudes</em>. This dissertation argues that this view is mistaken, and that its falsity has important implications for hate speech jurisprudence. I argue that, to grasp what makes slurs such potent verbal weapons, we ought conceive of them not only as tools for expression, but also as tools for a sadly neglected use of language that I term the <em>ballistic use </em>of language. I argue that, like a burning cross, or a swastika spray painted across a synagogue’s doors, an oppressive slur like the n-word is best understood as a tool for the infliction of traumatic associations on members of its target group.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Stillman, Richard"],"institution":"The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Stephen R. A. Neale"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Michael Devitt","Gary Ostertag","David Papineau"],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2021-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T02:00:35Z","subjects":["Philosophy of Language","Semantics and Pragmatics","Slurs","Associations","Free Speech","Reappropriation","Use-Mention Distinction"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4287","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Stephen R. A. Neale"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Michael Devitt","Gary Ostertag","David Papineau"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Stillman, Richard"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-06-03T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy of Language","Semantics and Pragmatics","Slurs","Associations","Free Speech","Reappropriation","Use-Mention Distinction"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4287"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Oppressive slurs like the n-word are fighting words par excellence. Their power to incite conflict and inflict emotional injury is unmatched by that of other, more commonplace insults. But what is it that makes oppressive slurs such potent verbal weapons? A commonplace view among both philosophers and legal theorists is that slurs make such potent insults because their uses convey extremely offensive, bigoted attitudes. This dissertation argues that this view is mistaken, and that its falsity has important implications for hate speech jurisprudence. I argue that, to grasp what makes slurs such potent verbal weapons, we ought conceive of them not only as tools for expression, but also as tools for a sadly neglected use of language that I term the ballistic use of language. I argue that, like a burning cross, or a swastika spray painted across a synagogue’s doors, an oppressive slur like the n-word is best understood as a tool for the infliction of traumatic associations on members of its target group.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Fighting Words: Slurs, Semantics, and the Law"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Stephen R. A. Neale"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Michael Devitt","Gary Ostertag","David Papineau"],"dc:creator":["Stillman, Richard"],"dc:date.available":["2023-06-03T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Oppressive slurs like the n-word are fighting words par excellence. Their power to incite conflict and inflict emotional injury is unmatched by that of other, more commonplace insults. But what is it that makes oppressive slurs such potent verbal weapons? A commonplace view among both philosophers and legal theorists is that slurs make such potent insults because their uses convey extremely offensive, bigoted attitudes. This dissertation argues that this view is mistaken, and that its falsity has important implications for hate speech jurisprudence. I argue that, to grasp what makes slurs such potent verbal weapons, we ought conceive of them not only as tools for expression, but also as tools for a sadly neglected use of language that I term the ballistic use of language. I argue that, like a burning cross, or a swastika spray painted across a synagogue’s doors, an oppressive slur like the n-word is best understood as a tool for the infliction of traumatic associations on members of its target group.
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