Semantic and global irrealism

This thesis is concerned with skepticism about linguistic meaning and the consequences that follow from this view. After clarifying various positions that support skepticism about meaning - broadly classified under the umbrella term semantic irrealism - I weave a common thread through these different characterizations and use that formulation for the remainder of the thesis. In chapter two I examine the premises for the argument that semantic irrealism globalizes to the conclusion that no sentence is substantially true. After evaluating attempts found within the literature to block this inference, I argue that it cannot be blocked in the ways considered. Chapter three is a response to objections that the global irrealist position is both incoherent and unstable. I argue that it is neither and conclude that if semantic irrealism is the case, then this necessarily entails global irrealism.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts (M.A.)

Level thesis:degree_level

Masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

Colorado State University. Libraries

Year dc:date.issued

2010

Authors dc:creator

• Perry, Jeremiah Alexander Burnette, author
• Losonsky, Michael, advisor
• Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member
• Troup, Lucy, committee member

• Skepticism
• Realism
• Semantics (Philosophy)

Statement dc:rights

• Copyright and other restrictions may apply. User is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws. For information about copyright law, please see https://libguides.colostate.edu/copyright.

Language dc:language.iso

eng, English

Identifier URI

https://doi.org/10.25675/3.018869

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:mountainscholar.org:10217/234718