{"id":{"repo_id":"colostate","oai_identifier":"oai:mountainscholar.org:10217/234718"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/colostate/oai:mountainscholar.org:10217/234718","repository":{"repo_id":"colostate","name":"Colorado State University","base_url":"https://api.mountainscholar.org/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Semantic and global irrealism","abstract":"This thesis is concerned with skepticism about linguistic meaning and the consequences that follow from this view. After clarifying various positions that support skepticism about meaning - broadly classified under the umbrella term semantic irrealism - I weave a common thread through these different characterizations and use that formulation for the remainder of the thesis. In chapter two I examine the premises for the argument that semantic irrealism globalizes to the conclusion that no sentence is substantially true. After evaluating attempts found within the literature to block this inference, I argue that it cannot be blocked in the ways considered. Chapter three is a response to objections that the global irrealist position is both incoherent and unstable. I argue that it is neither and conclude that if semantic irrealism is the case, then this necessarily entails global irrealism.","abstract_html":"This thesis is concerned with skepticism about linguistic meaning and the consequences that follow from this view. After clarifying various positions that support skepticism about meaning - broadly classified under the umbrella term semantic irrealism - I weave a common thread through these different characterizations and use that formulation for the remainder of the thesis. In chapter two I examine the premises for the argument that semantic irrealism globalizes to the conclusion that no sentence is substantially true. After evaluating attempts found within the literature to block this inference, I argue that it cannot be blocked in the ways considered. Chapter three is a response to objections that the global irrealist position is both incoherent and unstable. I argue that it is neither and conclude that if semantic irrealism is the case, then this necessarily entails global irrealism.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Perry, Jeremiah Alexander Burnette, author","Losonsky, Michael, advisor","Tropman, Elizabeth, committee member","Troup, Lucy, committee member"],"institution":"Colorado State University. 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In chapter two I examine the premises for the argument that semantic irrealism globalizes to the conclusion that no sentence is substantially true. After evaluating attempts found within the literature to block this inference, I argue that it cannot be blocked in the ways considered. Chapter three is a response to objections that the global irrealist position is both incoherent and unstable. 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