Abstract
dc:description.abstract<p>One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.</p>
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Science (MS)
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Thesis
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Behavioral and Computational Economics
- Year
- 2024
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Gilmore, James
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Dr. David Porter
Subjects
dc:subject × 2Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/3
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:digitalcommons.chapman.edu:behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses-1002