One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.
","abstract_html":"<p>One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gilmore, James"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Science (MS)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Behavioral and Computational Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Dr. David Porter"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-05-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-05-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:38:37Z","subjects":["Matching","Economic Theory"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/3","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Dr. David Porter"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gilmore, James"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Behavioral and Computational Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science (MS)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Matching","Economic Theory"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/3"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.
"]},{"key":"dc:source","label":"Dc Source","values":["Gilmore, J. (2024). Match stability with a costly and flexible number of positions [Master's thesis, Chapman University]. Chapman University Digital Commons. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000597"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Dr. David Porter"],"dc:creator":["Gilmore, James"],"dc:description.abstract":["One of the objectives of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents such that there is no incentive for pair deviation. The outcome of a match can significantly impact participants. While much of the existing research in this field addresses the matching with fixed quotas, this is not always applicable. We introduce the concept of slot stability, recognizing the potential motivation for organizations to modify their quotas after the match. We propose an algorithm designed to create stable and slot stable matches by employing flexible, endogenous quotas to address this issue.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/behavioral_and_computational_economics_theses/3"],"dc:source":["Gilmore, J. (2024). Match stability with a costly and flexible number of positions [Master's thesis, Chapman University]. Chapman University Digital Commons. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000597"],"dc:subject":["Matching","Economic Theory"],"dc:title":["Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Behavioral and Computational Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Science (MS)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:38:37Z"}