The citizen: an Ubuntu personalism conception

In this thesis, I argue for an Ubuntu personalism conception of the citizen as a foundationalist account of a grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I start with John Rawls who employed what he called a political conception of the citizen to develop a neutralist theory of justice. In expounding this, I argue that he excluded certain categories of human beings in an unacceptable way, most notably the severely cognitively disabled; and that the neutralism he targeted – his major contribution – is illusive. I then go in search of an alternative grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I explore philosophical personalism as an alternative, identifying major strengths in the intellectual movement for the purposes of grounding the pluralist political arrangement. But I also identify major weaknesses in personalism – in the thought of Juan Manuel Burgos, which is a current, cutting-edge version of personalism; as well as in the thought of the older John Macmurray – an excellent example of social constitution of persons theory. This opens the way for an exploration of Ubuntu personalism. I explore a metaphysical account of Ubuntu, as well as Ubuntu as an ethic, and show how this leads to a socially constituted conception of the person which sits at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. I say how the citizen is this kind of person and show how it is this conception of the person that best grounds the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights.

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Department of Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Seale, Wade

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Hull, George

• Ubuntu
• Personalism

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/42660

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/42660