{"id":{"repo_id":"cape-town","oai_identifier":"oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/42660"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cape-town/oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/42660","repository":{"repo_id":"cape-town","name":"University of Cape Town","base_url":"https://open.uct.ac.za/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The citizen: an Ubuntu personalism conception","abstract":"In this thesis, I argue for an Ubuntu personalism conception of the citizen as a foundationalist account of a grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I start with John Rawls who employed what he called a political conception of the citizen to develop a neutralist theory of justice. In expounding this, I argue that he excluded certain categories of human beings in an unacceptable way, most notably the severely cognitively disabled; and that the neutralism he targeted – his major contribution – is illusive. I then go in search of an alternative grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I explore philosophical personalism as an alternative, identifying major strengths in the intellectual movement for the purposes of grounding the pluralist political arrangement. But I also identify major weaknesses in personalism – in the thought of Juan Manuel Burgos, which is a current, cutting-edge version of personalism; as well as in the thought of the older John Macmurray – an excellent example of social constitution of persons theory. This opens the way for an exploration of Ubuntu personalism. I explore a metaphysical account of Ubuntu, as well as Ubuntu as an ethic, and show how this leads to a socially constituted conception of the person which sits at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. I say how the citizen is this kind of person and show how it is this conception of the person that best grounds the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights.","abstract_html":"In this thesis, I argue for an Ubuntu personalism conception of the citizen as a foundationalist account of a grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I start with John Rawls who employed what he called a political conception of the citizen to develop a neutralist theory of justice. In expounding this, I argue that he excluded certain categories of human beings in an unacceptable way, most notably the severely cognitively disabled; and that the neutralism he targeted – his major contribution – is illusive. I then go in search of an alternative grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I explore philosophical personalism as an alternative, identifying major strengths in the intellectual movement for the purposes of grounding the pluralist political arrangement. But I also identify major weaknesses in personalism – in the thought of Juan Manuel Burgos, which is a current, cutting-edge version of personalism; as well as in the thought of the older John Macmurray – an excellent example of social constitution of persons theory. This opens the way for an exploration of Ubuntu personalism. I explore a metaphysical account of Ubuntu, as well as Ubuntu as an ethic, and show how this leads to a socially constituted conception of the person which sits at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. I say how the citizen is this kind of person and show how it is this conception of the person that best grounds the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Seale, Wade"],"institution":"Department of Philosophy","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Hull, George"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025","date_published":"2025","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:23:17Z","subjects":["Ubuntu","Personalism"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11427/42660","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Hull, George"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Seale, Wade"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-01-23T10:53:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2026-01-23T10:53:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["Department of Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cape Town"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis / Dissertation"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral","PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Ubuntu","Personalism"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11427/42660"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this thesis, I argue for an Ubuntu personalism conception of the citizen as a foundationalist account of a grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I start with John Rawls who employed what he called a political conception of the citizen to develop a neutralist theory of justice. In expounding this, I argue that he excluded certain categories of human beings in an unacceptable way, most notably the severely cognitively disabled; and that the neutralism he targeted – his major contribution – is illusive. I then go in search of an alternative grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I explore philosophical personalism as an alternative, identifying major strengths in the intellectual movement for the purposes of grounding the pluralist political arrangement. But I also identify major weaknesses in personalism – in the thought of Juan Manuel Burgos, which is a current, cutting-edge version of personalism; as well as in the thought of the older John Macmurray – an excellent example of social constitution of persons theory. This opens the way for an exploration of Ubuntu personalism. I explore a metaphysical account of Ubuntu, as well as Ubuntu as an ethic, and show how this leads to a socially constituted conception of the person which sits at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. I say how the citizen is this kind of person and show how it is this conception of the person that best grounds the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The citizen: an Ubuntu personalism conception"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Hull, George"],"dc:creator":["Seale, Wade"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-01-23T10:53:35Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-01-23T10:53:35Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2025"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this thesis, I argue for an Ubuntu personalism conception of the citizen as a foundationalist account of a grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I start with John Rawls who employed what he called a political conception of the citizen to develop a neutralist theory of justice. In expounding this, I argue that he excluded certain categories of human beings in an unacceptable way, most notably the severely cognitively disabled; and that the neutralism he targeted – his major contribution – is illusive. I then go in search of an alternative grounding for the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights. I explore philosophical personalism as an alternative, identifying major strengths in the intellectual movement for the purposes of grounding the pluralist political arrangement. But I also identify major weaknesses in personalism – in the thought of Juan Manuel Burgos, which is a current, cutting-edge version of personalism; as well as in the thought of the older John Macmurray – an excellent example of social constitution of persons theory. This opens the way for an exploration of Ubuntu personalism. I explore a metaphysical account of Ubuntu, as well as Ubuntu as an ethic, and show how this leads to a socially constituted conception of the person which sits at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. I say how the citizen is this kind of person and show how it is this conception of the person that best grounds the pluralist political arrangement based on human rights."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11427/42660"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:publisher.department":["Department of Philosophy"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Cape Town"],"dc:subject":["Ubuntu","Personalism"],"dc:title":["The citizen: an Ubuntu personalism conception"],"dc:type":["Thesis / Dissertation"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["Doctoral","PhD"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:23:17Z"}