Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality

The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call "self-deception" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from "weak" to "hard" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of "weak" to "hard" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of " deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible.

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Department of Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

1987

Author dc:creator

• Bak, Nelleke

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Brooks, David

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16339