{"id":{"repo_id":"cape-town","oai_identifier":"oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16339"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cape-town/oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16339","repository":{"repo_id":"cape-town","name":"University of Cape Town","base_url":"https://open.uct.ac.za/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality","abstract":"The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call \"self-deception\" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from \"weak\" to \"hard\" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of \"weak\" to \"hard\" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of \" deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible.","abstract_html":"The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call "self-deception" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from "weak" to "hard" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of "weak" to "hard" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of " deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bak, Nelleke"],"institution":"Department of Philosophy","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Brooks, David"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1987,"date_issued":"1987","date_published":"1987","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:23:01Z","subjects":[],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Brooks, David"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Bak, Nelleke"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2016-01-12T11:16:32Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-01-12T11:16:32Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1987"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.department","label":"Dc Publisher Department","values":["Department of Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cape Town"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Master Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["MA"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Bibliography: pages 230-233."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call \"self-deception\" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from \"weak\" to \"hard\" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of \"weak\" to \"hard\" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of \" deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Brooks, David"],"dc:creator":["Bak, Nelleke"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2016-01-12T11:16:32Z"],"dc:date.available":["2016-01-12T11:16:32Z"],"dc:date.issued":["1987"],"dc:description":["Bibliography: pages 230-233."],"dc:description.abstract":["The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call \"self-deception\" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from \"weak\" to \"hard\" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of \"weak\" to \"hard\" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of \" deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher.department":["Department of Philosophy"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Cape Town"],"dc:title":["Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality"],"dc:type":["Master Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["Masters"],"dc:type.qualificationname":["MA"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:23:01Z"}