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University of Cambridge

The Auditing and Management of the Clare Estate under Elizabeth de Burgh, 1317-60

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis explains how medieval estates managed the local officials they employed to run their manor farms. These estates employed auditors and gave them the power to penalise local farm managers for overspending and missing productivity targets. The key finding is the sheer number of times these targets were missed. The failings were often minor, but the fact that charges were regularly imposed illustrates the exacting standards expected of employees working on demesne farms. The Clare administration under Elizabeth de Burgh has been chosen as a case study for detailed examination, with comparisons to other estates in chapter 6. As explored in chapter 1, the Clare accounts contain important contextual evidence for interpreting the auditors’ alterations to transactions and wage payments as penalties. Chapter 2 charts how the auditors’ enthusiasm for imposing penalties changed over time. Chapters 3 and 4 assess which types of expense were most frequently contested at the audit, where, and with what consequences for managers’ remuneration. Chapter 5 tests the willingness of manorial officials to fulfil estate aims where the threat of penalties at the audit was more remote. There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. First, estates of all sizes empowered their auditors to impose penalties, highlighting the power of manorial lordship, particularly in the early fourteenth century. Second, farm managers occasionally willingly remained in office despite experiencing very severe penalties at the audit. In these cases, it is likely that a considerable informal economy made officeholding worthwhile. Third, the Clare estate always monitored arable husbandry closely by appointing grangers to help count the harvest. However, some estates in the later fourteenth century relied on minimum targets determined at the audit instead. This reduced costs, but also the grain yields recorded in the accounts. These conclusions highlight the importance of paying attention to the auditing process when using the information recorded in account rolls. The auditors’ interventions are often inconspicuous, but collectively, they present a picture of seigneurial weakness and decline over the fourteenth century.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
Doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Cambridge
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gasson, Jerome
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Briggs, Chris

Subjects

dc:subject × 8

Rights

dc:rights
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Author Identifier
0009-0001-5853-3761
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/391758

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Cambridge University
Base URL
api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Gasson, Jerome. The Auditing and Management of the Clare Estate under Elizabeth de Burgh, 1317-60. Doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2025. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.122770