{"id":{"repo_id":"cambridge","oai_identifier":"oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/391758"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/cambridge/oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/391758","repository":{"repo_id":"cambridge","name":"Cambridge University","base_url":"https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Auditing and Management of the Clare Estate under Elizabeth de Burgh, 1317-60","abstract":"This thesis explains how medieval estates managed the local officials they employed to run their manor farms. These estates employed auditors and gave them the power to penalise local farm managers for overspending and missing productivity targets. The key finding is the sheer number of times these targets were missed. The failings were often minor, but the fact that charges were regularly imposed illustrates the exacting standards expected of employees working on demesne farms. The Clare administration under Elizabeth de Burgh has been chosen as a case study for detailed examination, with comparisons to other estates in chapter 6. As explored in chapter 1, the Clare accounts contain important contextual evidence for interpreting the auditors’ alterations to transactions and wage payments as penalties. Chapter 2 charts how the auditors’ enthusiasm for imposing penalties changed over time. Chapters 3 and 4 assess which types of expense were most frequently contested at the audit, where, and with what consequences for managers’ remuneration. Chapter 5 tests the willingness of manorial officials to fulfil estate aims where the threat of penalties at the audit was more remote. There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. First, estates of all sizes empowered their auditors to impose penalties, highlighting the power of manorial lordship, particularly in the early fourteenth century. Second, farm managers occasionally willingly remained in office despite experiencing very severe penalties at the audit. In these cases, it is likely that a considerable informal economy made officeholding worthwhile. Third, the Clare estate always monitored arable husbandry closely by appointing grangers to help count the harvest. However, some estates in the later fourteenth century relied on minimum targets determined at the audit instead. This reduced costs, but also the grain yields recorded in the accounts. These conclusions highlight the importance of paying attention to the auditing process when using the information recorded in account rolls. The auditors’ interventions are often inconspicuous, but collectively, they present a picture of seigneurial weakness and decline over the fourteenth century.","abstract_html":"This thesis explains how medieval estates managed the local officials they employed to run their manor farms. These estates employed auditors and gave them the power to penalise local farm managers for overspending and missing productivity targets. The key finding is the sheer number of times these targets were missed. The failings were often minor, but the fact that charges were regularly imposed illustrates the exacting standards expected of employees working on demesne farms. The Clare administration under Elizabeth de Burgh has been chosen as a case study for detailed examination, with comparisons to other estates in chapter 6. As explored in chapter 1, the Clare accounts contain important contextual evidence for interpreting the auditors’ alterations to transactions and wage payments as penalties. Chapter 2 charts how the auditors’ enthusiasm for imposing penalties changed over time. Chapters 3 and 4 assess which types of expense were most frequently contested at the audit, where, and with what consequences for managers’ remuneration. Chapter 5 tests the willingness of manorial officials to fulfil estate aims where the threat of penalties at the audit was more remote. There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. First, estates of all sizes empowered their auditors to impose penalties, highlighting the power of manorial lordship, particularly in the early fourteenth century. Second, farm managers occasionally willingly remained in office despite experiencing very severe penalties at the audit. In these cases, it is likely that a considerable informal economy made officeholding worthwhile. Third, the Clare estate always monitored arable husbandry closely by appointing grangers to help count the harvest. However, some estates in the later fourteenth century relied on minimum targets determined at the audit instead. This reduced costs, but also the grain yields recorded in the accounts. These conclusions highlight the importance of paying attention to the auditing process when using the information recorded in account rolls. The auditors’ interventions are often inconspicuous, but collectively, they present a picture of seigneurial weakness and decline over the fourteenth century.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gasson, Jerome"],"institution":"University of Cambridge","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Briggs, Chris"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-05-09","date_published":"2025-05-09","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:23:54Z","subjects":["Agricultural History","Black Death","Economic History","Elizabeth de Burgh","Local Officials","Manorial Accounts","Manors","Medieval History"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/ebb95856-0210-44eb-9771-9bc1b071f078/download","http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0009000158533761"],"render_values":[{"text":"0009-0001-5853-3761","href":"https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5853-3761","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.122770","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Briggs, Chris"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.sponsor","label":"Sponsor","values":["Cambridge Trust and Magdalene College"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gasson, Jerome"]},{"key":"dc:creator.authoridentifier","label":"Author Identifier","values":["0009000158533761"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025-05-09"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Cambridge"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/391758"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationname","label":"Dc Type Qualificationname","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Agricultural History","Black Death","Economic History","Elizabeth de Burgh","Local Officials","Manorial Accounts","Manors","Medieval History"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/ebb95856-0210-44eb-9771-9bc1b071f078/download","http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.122770"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/231f724e-bf0c-46e6-a312-c6983ea79ade/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis explains how medieval estates managed the local officials they employed to run their manor farms. These estates employed auditors and gave them the power to penalise local farm managers for overspending and missing productivity targets. The key finding is the sheer number of times these targets were missed. The failings were often minor, but the fact that charges were regularly imposed illustrates the exacting standards expected of employees working on demesne farms. The Clare administration under Elizabeth de Burgh has been chosen as a case study for detailed examination, with comparisons to other estates in chapter 6. As explored in chapter 1, the Clare accounts contain important contextual evidence for interpreting the auditors’ alterations to transactions and wage payments as penalties. Chapter 2 charts how the auditors’ enthusiasm for imposing penalties changed over time. Chapters 3 and 4 assess which types of expense were most frequently contested at the audit, where, and with what consequences for managers’ remuneration. Chapter 5 tests the willingness of manorial officials to fulfil estate aims where the threat of penalties at the audit was more remote. There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. First, estates of all sizes empowered their auditors to impose penalties, highlighting the power of manorial lordship, particularly in the early fourteenth century. Second, farm managers occasionally willingly remained in office despite experiencing very severe penalties at the audit. In these cases, it is likely that a considerable informal economy made officeholding worthwhile. Third, the Clare estate always monitored arable husbandry closely by appointing grangers to help count the harvest. However, some estates in the later fourteenth century relied on minimum targets determined at the audit instead. This reduced costs, but also the grain yields recorded in the accounts. These conclusions highlight the importance of paying attention to the auditing process when using the information recorded in account rolls. The auditors’ interventions are often inconspicuous, but collectively, they present a picture of seigneurial weakness and decline over the fourteenth century."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["042a0a49ae9661c855b4caa7be8f189c","87eda9de84448d1f82354d60eee3eb5f"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Auditing and Management of the Clare Estate under Elizabeth de Burgh, 1317-60"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Briggs, Chris"],"dc:contributor.sponsor":["Cambridge Trust and Magdalene College"],"dc:creator":["Gasson, Jerome"],"dc:creator.authoridentifier":["0009000158533761"],"dc:date.issued":["2025-05-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis explains how medieval estates managed the local officials they employed to run their manor farms. 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Chapter 5 tests the willingness of manorial officials to fulfil estate aims where the threat of penalties at the audit was more remote. There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. First, estates of all sizes empowered their auditors to impose penalties, highlighting the power of manorial lordship, particularly in the early fourteenth century. Second, farm managers occasionally willingly remained in office despite experiencing very severe penalties at the audit. In these cases, it is likely that a considerable informal economy made officeholding worthwhile. Third, the Clare estate always monitored arable husbandry closely by appointing grangers to help count the harvest. However, some estates in the later fourteenth century relied on minimum targets determined at the audit instead. This reduced costs, but also the grain yields recorded in the accounts. 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