The United Kingdom's Responses to Adverse Strasbourg Judgments: A Look Inside Government

This thesis seeks to explain how the UK responds to adverse European Court of Human Rights judgments and why it responds in the ways that it does. Existing scholarship fails to provide a convincing answer: international literature does not explain state internal workings and domestic literature considers possible influences or constraints on the UK Government rather than the Government itself. This is problematic as Government is responsible for international compliance with judgments under its prerogative powers and domestic implementation of judgments due to its de facto dominance of formulation, development and execution of public policy. Therefore, I look inside Government through interviews with current and former officials, ministers and advisers. I present my findings in four stages. First, I set out the people and processes involved, demonstrating that in practice, the process is flexible and can vary significantly from official guidance. Furthermore, occupants of roles vary from case to case, resulting in different responses. Secondly, I set out the legal, policy and political choices for those involved, examining those related to: the legal obligations following an adverse judgment; the substantive response; and the vehicle for the response. Thirdly, I illustrate the extent of the complexity and fluidity of the internal organisation, processes and choices through a case study, Hirst v United Kingdom, arguing that the prolonged non-compliance and subsequent case closure were due to the (mis)alignment of politics and law, and whether willing individuals were able to make and take the necessary choices and actions. Lastly, I argue that it is the people who hold positions within government who largely determine the UK’s responses to adverse Strasbourg judgments. Their objectives, beliefs, relationships, personalities, interests, knowledge, abilities, motivations and backgrounds affect their choices and actions. They operate within fluid and malleable constraints: internal-institutional, wider constitutional, and external.

Name dc:type.qualificationname

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

Doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

University of Cambridge

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Robinson, Dora

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Young, Alison

• European Court of Human Rights
• Strasbourg
• Constitutional Law
• Civil Service
• Human Rights Law
• International Law
• Foreign Relations Law
• UK Government
• Socio-legal Studies

Licence

• https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/743ebc29-03e8-4413-9eb5-38530a75ce21/download
• http://purl.org/NET/rdflicense/allrightsreserved

DOI dc:identifier.doi

https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.119582

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/386287