Schopenhauer's Pessimism and Kant's Moral Argument

In this thesis, I argue that Kant's Moral Argument gives good grounds to reject Schopenhauer's pessimism. I begin by defining pessimism as the view that "life is not choiceworthy," and dispelling some initial objections to it. Having established that pessimism doesn't succumb to obvious objections, I develop three lines of argument that tell in favor of it, each articulated in a chapter of its own that explains how Schopenhauer reconceives the categories of, in order, will, goodness, and death. Schopenhauer’s overall argument moves from will to goodness to death; and in the third and final section of the thesis I demonstrate how Kant's Moral Argument undercuts the crucial assumption about death on which his case for pessimism depends (i.e. mortalism). I conclude by rejecting an evidentialist objection to the Moral Argument, according to which evidence provides the only justifiable grounds for believing in anything, including, crucially, in a just afterlife.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts (MA)

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Graduate Studies

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Reid, Walter Joseph

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Migotti, Mark

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Goldstein, Joshua
• Framarin, Chris
• Fantl, Jeremy

• Philosophy

Statement dc:rights

• University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.

Language dc:language.iso

eng

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27714

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:11023/3195