{"id":{"repo_id":"calgary","oai_identifier":"oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:11023/3195"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/calgary/oai:ucalgary.scholaris.ca:11023/3195","repository":{"repo_id":"calgary","name":"University of Calgary","base_url":"https://ucalgary.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Schopenhauer's Pessimism and Kant's Moral Argument","abstract":"In this thesis, I argue that Kant's Moral Argument gives good grounds to reject Schopenhauer's pessimism. I begin by defining pessimism as the view that "life is not choiceworthy," and dispelling some initial objections to it. Having established that pessimism doesn't succumb to obvious objections, I develop three lines of argument that tell in favor of it, each articulated in a chapter of its own that explains how Schopenhauer reconceives the categories of, in order, will, goodness, and death. Schopenhauer’s overall argument moves from will to goodness to death; and in the third and final section of the thesis I demonstrate how Kant's Moral Argument undercuts the crucial assumption about death on which his case for pessimism depends (i.e. mortalism). I conclude by rejecting an evidentialist objection to the Moral Argument, according to which evidence provides the only justifiable grounds for believing in anything, including, crucially, in a just afterlife.","abstract_html":"In this thesis, I argue that Kant's Moral Argument gives good grounds to reject Schopenhauer's pessimism. I begin by defining pessimism as the view that "life is not choiceworthy," and dispelling some initial objections to it. Having established that pessimism doesn't succumb to obvious objections, I develop three lines of argument that tell in favor of it, each articulated in a chapter of its own that explains how Schopenhauer reconceives the categories of, in order, will, goodness, and death. Schopenhauer’s overall argument moves from will to goodness to death; and in the third and final section of the thesis I demonstrate how Kant's Moral Argument undercuts the crucial assumption about death on which his case for pessimism depends (i.e. mortalism). I conclude by rejecting an evidentialist objection to the Moral Argument, according to which evidence provides the only justifiable grounds for believing in anything, including, crucially, in a just afterlife.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Reid, Walter Joseph"],"institution":"Graduate Studies","degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Migotti, Mark"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Goldstein, Joshua","Framarin, Chris","Fantl, Jeremy"],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016","date_published":"2016","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:30:13Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27714"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27714","href":"http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27714","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3195","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Migotti, Mark"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Goldstein, Joshua","Framarin, Chris","Fantl, Jeremy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Reid, Walter Joseph"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2016-08-19T19:27:40Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-08-19T19:27:40Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2016"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Calgary"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["master thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Calgary"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. 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