The trade balancing act : reconciling domestic and foreign politics.

This paper examines the motives for policymakers in their use of antidumping tariffs. In a scenario where a country is facing domestic political economy influences and foreign political economy influences, I find evidence that countries are not in a repeated "prisoner's dilemma" game, but they are in a game of "chicken." In the repeated tariff-setting game, countries take turns in setting antidumping tariffs to appease domestic producers and minimize injury to relationships with important trading partners. I also find that, when examining the US antidumping tariff decisions specifically, the International Trade Association sets tariffs significantly lower against the most important trading partners, a result shown through OLS and instrumental variables regressions.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.S.

Level thesis:degree_level

Masters

Grantor

Baylor University.

Year dc:date.issued

2010

Author dc:creator

• Abbott, Patricia A. (Patricia Anne), 1987-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Pham, Van Hoang.

• World Trade Organization.
• Antidumping.
• Political economy.
• Trade.
• Tariffs.
• Cooperation.

Statement dc:rights

• Baylor University works are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2104/8015

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/8015