{"id":{"repo_id":"baylor","oai_identifier":"oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/8015"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/baylor/oai:baylor-ir.tdl.org:2104/8015","repository":{"repo_id":"baylor","name":"Baylor University","base_url":"https://baylor-ir.tdl.org/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The trade balancing act : reconciling domestic and foreign politics.","abstract":"This paper examines the motives for policymakers in their use of antidumping tariffs. In a scenario where a country is facing domestic political economy influences and foreign political economy influences, I find evidence that countries are not in a repeated "prisoner's dilemma" game, but they are in a game of "chicken." In the repeated tariff-setting game, countries take turns in setting antidumping tariffs to appease domestic producers and minimize injury to relationships with important trading partners. I also find that, when examining the US antidumping tariff decisions specifically, the International Trade Association sets tariffs significantly lower against the most important trading partners, a result shown through OLS and instrumental variables regressions.","abstract_html":"This paper examines the motives for policymakers in their use of antidumping tariffs. In a scenario where a country is facing domestic political economy influences and foreign political economy influences, I find evidence that countries are not in a repeated "prisoner's dilemma" game, but they are in a game of "chicken." In the repeated tariff-setting game, countries take turns in setting antidumping tariffs to appease domestic producers and minimize injury to relationships with important trading partners. 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