Human goodness and natural goodness

In this thesis, I draw a comparison between the moral philosophies and ethics of Philippa Foot and Charles Taylor. Foot is perhaps best known for her contribution to neo-Aristotelian ‘virtue ethics’, including her influential work on the meanings of moral concepts and the rationality of moral action. While Taylor is better known as a social and political theorist, I am more interested in his studies of language and human agency, especially as these connect with the more traditional concerns of philosophical ethics and practical philosophy. A key point of tension between the two accounts appears in Foot’s later naturalistic turn, which seems to constrast sharply with Taylor’s interpretive, and strongly anti-naturalistic, approach. In what follows I will explore the various facets of this apparent disagreement. I argue that there is a robust agreement between the two standpoints despite the surface appearances.

Name thesis:degree_name

PhD

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

ResearchSpace@Auckland

Year dc:date.issued

2018

Author dc:creator

• Perryman, Matthew

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Russell, M

Statement dc:rights

• Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/2292/47623

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:researchspace.auckland.ac.nz:2292/47623