{"id":{"repo_id":"auckland-ms","oai_identifier":"oai:researchspace.auckland.ac.nz:2292/47623"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/auckland-ms/oai:researchspace.auckland.ac.nz:2292/47623","repository":{"repo_id":"auckland-ms","name":"University of Auckland","base_url":"https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Human goodness and natural goodness","abstract":"In this thesis, I draw a comparison between the moral philosophies and ethics of Philippa Foot and Charles Taylor. Foot is perhaps best known for her contribution to neo-Aristotelian ‘virtue ethics’, including her influential work on the meanings of moral concepts and the rationality of moral action. While Taylor is better known as a social and political theorist, I am more interested in his studies of language and human agency, especially as these connect with the more traditional concerns of philosophical ethics and practical philosophy. A key point of tension between the two accounts appears in Foot’s later naturalistic turn, which seems to constrast sharply with Taylor’s interpretive, and strongly anti-naturalistic, approach. In what follows I will explore the various facets of this apparent disagreement. I argue that there is a robust agreement between the two standpoints despite the surface appearances.","abstract_html":"In this thesis, I draw a comparison between the moral philosophies and ethics of Philippa Foot and Charles Taylor. Foot is perhaps best known for her contribution to neo-Aristotelian ‘virtue ethics’, including her influential work on the meanings of moral concepts and the rationality of moral action. While Taylor is better known as a social and political theorist, I am more interested in his studies of language and human agency, especially as these connect with the more traditional concerns of philosophical ethics and practical philosophy. A key point of tension between the two accounts appears in Foot’s later naturalistic turn, which seems to constrast sharply with Taylor’s interpretive, and strongly anti-naturalistic, approach. In what follows I will explore the various facets of this apparent disagreement. I argue that there is a robust agreement between the two standpoints despite the surface appearances.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Perryman, Matthew"],"institution":"ResearchSpace@Auckland","degree_name":"PhD","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Russell, M"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018","date_published":"2018","updated_at":"2026-07-24T01:04:52Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. 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A key point of tension between the two accounts appears in Foot’s later naturalistic turn, which seems to constrast sharply with Taylor’s interpretive, and strongly anti-naturalistic, approach. In what follows I will explore the various facets of this apparent disagreement. I argue that there is a robust agreement between the two standpoints despite the surface appearances."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2292/47623"],"dc:publisher":["ResearchSpace@Auckland"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["UoA99265184313402091"],"dc:rights":["Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. 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