The Determinants and Consequences of Disclosure Committee Adoption

<p>After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission recommended that companies voluntarily adopt disclosure committees to aid in preparing company disclosures. In this paper, I investigate the determinants and consequences of disclosure committee adoption. I find that companies with material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting and less readable 10-K filings are more likely to adopt disclosure committees. In consequences analyses, using a propensity score matched control sample and a difference-in-differences research design, I find that 10-K filings are longer and less readable after disclosure committee adoption. However, consistent with institutional theory, I do not find evidence of a reduction in information asymmetry or an increase in the informativeness of earnings following disclosure committee adoption.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Year dc:date.available

2015

Author dc:creator

• Schmardebeck, Lyle Roy

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Myers, Linda A.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Cassell, Cory A.
• Myers, James N.

• Social sciences
• Accounting
• Corporate governance
• Disclosure
• Disclosure committee
• Earnings informativeness
• Information asymmetry
• Business Administration, Management, and Operations
• Corporate Finance

Repository record dc:identifier

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1188

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarworks.uark.edu:etd-2187