Defending the Multiple Realization Argument against the Identity Theory

<p>A classic argument in the philosophy of mind is that the identity theory is false because mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types. In this dissertation I provide a detailed elaboration of the argument and a defense of it against a few of its prominent contemporary critics. Finally I offer empirical evidence from inter-species differences in humans and monkeys, and also from a case of extensive neural plasticity, which shows that mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Year dc:date.available

2012

Author dc:creator

• Barrett, David

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Lyons, Jack

Contributors dc:contributor

• Funkhouser, Eric M.
• Senor, Thomas D.

• Philosophy
• religion and theology
• Identity theory
• Multiple realization
• Neural plasticity
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Science

Repository record dc:identifier

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/459

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarworks.uark.edu:etd-1458