A classic argument in the philosophy of mind is that the identity theory is false because mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types. In this dissertation I provide a detailed elaboration of the argument and a defense of it against a few of its prominent contemporary critics. Finally I offer empirical evidence from inter-species differences in humans and monkeys, and also from a case of extensive neural plasticity, which shows that mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types.
","abstract_html":"<p>A classic argument in the philosophy of mind is that the identity theory is false because mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types. In this dissertation I provide a detailed elaboration of the argument and a defense of it against a few of its prominent contemporary critics. Finally I offer empirical evidence from inter-species differences in humans and monkeys, and also from a case of extensive neural plasticity, which shows that mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Barrett, David"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Funkhouser, Eric M.","Senor, Thomas D."],"advisors":["Lyons, Jack"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-08-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2012-08-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T00:59:58Z","subjects":["Philosophy","religion and theology","Identity theory","Multiple realization","Neural plasticity","Philosophy of Mind","Philosophy of Science"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/459","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Funkhouser, Eric M.","Senor, Thomas D."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Lyons, Jack"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Barrett, David"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2017-09-29T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","religion and theology","Identity theory","Multiple realization","Neural plasticity","Philosophy of Mind","Philosophy of Science"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/459"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["A classic argument in the philosophy of mind is that the identity theory is false because mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types. In this dissertation I provide a detailed elaboration of the argument and a defense of it against a few of its prominent contemporary critics. Finally I offer empirical evidence from inter-species differences in humans and monkeys, and also from a case of extensive neural plasticity, which shows that mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types.
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