Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts
- Level thesis:degree_level
- masters
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Virginia Tech
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Key, Andrew Braxton
- Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
-
- Klagge, James C.
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Wodak, Daniel
- Patton, Lydia K.
Subjects
dc:subject × 3Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- In Copyright
- Licence dc:rights.uri
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Other
- vt_gsexam:20497
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/90658