{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/90658"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/90658","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Limited Revisionism and Error Theory","abstract":"In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses.","abstract_html":"In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Key, Andrew Braxton"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Klagge, James C."],"committee_members":["Wodak, Daniel","Patton, Lydia K."],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-06-25","date_published":"2019-06-25","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:17Z","subjects":["Metaethics","Error Theory","Metanormativity"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:20497"],"render_values":[{"text":"vt_gsexam:20497","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/90658","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Klagge, James C."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Wodak, Daniel","Patton, Lydia K."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Key, Andrew Braxton"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2019-06-26T08:00:39Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-06-26T08:00:39Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2019-06-25"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Metaethics","Error Theory","Metanormativity"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:20497"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/90658"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstractgeneral","label":"General Abstract","values":["In this paper, I argue against Joyce’s assertion that if our moral terms centrally implicate falsehoods, we should act as though morality is true (because it’s useful) while also believing that it’s false (because doing otherwise would be epistemically irresponsible). I show Joyce’s position rests on a specific misunderstanding of how language operates, and argue instead that, if we accept that our current moral talk centrally implicates falsehoods, we should be open to slightly revising our moral terms to avoid implicating such falsehoods instead. I also show that my position, limited revisionism, avoids a few expected pitfalls—most importantly, it doesn’t overgeneralize and apply to terms like “witch” and “phlogiston,” which also centrally implicate falsehoods but seem like terms that shouldn’t be open to conceptual change."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Limited Revisionism and Error Theory"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Klagge, James C."],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Wodak, Daniel","Patton, Lydia K."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Key, Andrew Braxton"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-06-26T08:00:39Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-06-26T08:00:39Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-06-25"],"dc:description.abstract":["In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. 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I also show that my position, limited revisionism, avoids a few expected pitfalls—most importantly, it doesn’t overgeneralize and apply to terms like “witch” and “phlogiston,” which also centrally implicate falsehoods but seem like terms that shouldn’t be open to conceptual change."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:format.medium":["ETD"],"dc:identifier.other":["vt_gsexam:20497"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/90658"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Metaethics","Error Theory","Metanormativity"],"dc:title":["Limited Revisionism and Error Theory"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:17Z"}