Berkeley's Master Argument: Its Form and Implications

This study presents a new interpretation of Berkeley's 'master argument', which challenges the materialist to 'conceive it possible' that even one perceptible object (e.g., a tree or an idea) exists 'independently' of all minds. Specifically, after surveying the literature on Berkeley's master argument in Chapter I of this study, Chapter II interprets the master argument as an argument from meaning which purports to prove meaningless the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds. And in the course of developing this interpretation, Chapter II of this study analyzes the treatment of meaning which appears in the master argument's context in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge. Chapter III of this study, in turn, argues that, when interpreted as an argument from meaning, Berkeley's master argument avoids a common objection to it in the literature---i.e., that if it impugns the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds, it also rules out Berkeley's claiming that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of his mind. The fourth chapter of this study argues that unbeknownst to commentators, at least part of Berkeley's well-known critique of abstract ideas represents an argument from meaning. Finally, this study's appendix argues that the first two of Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous represent an argument from meaning as well.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Williams, Reginald

Contributors dc:contributor

• McKim, Robert

• Philosophy

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3199175

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87595