{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87595"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87595","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Berkeley's Master Argument: Its Form and Implications","abstract":"This study presents a new interpretation of Berkeley's 'master argument', which challenges the materialist to 'conceive it possible' that even one perceptible object (e.g., a tree or an idea) exists 'independently' of all minds. Specifically, after surveying the literature on Berkeley's master argument in Chapter I of this study, Chapter II interprets the master argument as an argument from meaning which purports to prove meaningless the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds. And in the course of developing this interpretation, Chapter II of this study analyzes the treatment of meaning which appears in the master argument's context in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge. Chapter III of this study, in turn, argues that, when interpreted as an argument from meaning, Berkeley's master argument avoids a common objection to it in the literature---i.e., that if it impugns the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds, it also rules out Berkeley's claiming that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of his mind. The fourth chapter of this study argues that unbeknownst to commentators, at least part of Berkeley's well-known critique of abstract ideas represents an argument from meaning. Finally, this study's appendix argues that the first two of Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous represent an argument from meaning as well.","abstract_html":"This study presents a new interpretation of Berkeley's 'master argument', which challenges the materialist to 'conceive it possible' that even one perceptible object (e.g., a tree or an idea) exists 'independently' of all minds. Specifically, after surveying the literature on Berkeley's master argument in Chapter I of this study, Chapter II interprets the master argument as an argument from meaning which purports to prove meaningless the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds. And in the course of developing this interpretation, Chapter II of this study analyzes the treatment of meaning which appears in the master argument's context in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge. Chapter III of this study, in turn, argues that, when interpreted as an argument from meaning, Berkeley's master argument avoids a common objection to it in the literature---i.e., that if it impugns the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds, it also rules out Berkeley's claiming that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of his mind. The fourth chapter of this study argues that unbeknownst to commentators, at least part of Berkeley's well-known critique of abstract ideas represents an argument from meaning. Finally, this study's appendix argues that the first two of Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous represent an argument from meaning as well.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Williams, Reginald"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["McKim, Robert"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-28T16:20:49Z","date_published":"2015-09-28T16:20:49Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:30Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3199175"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3199175","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87595","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["McKim, Robert"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Williams, Reginald"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-28T16:20:49Z","10000-01-01","2005"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87595","(MiAaPQ)AAI3199175"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This study presents a new interpretation of Berkeley's 'master argument', which challenges the materialist to 'conceive it possible' that even one perceptible object (e.g., a tree or an idea) exists 'independently' of all minds. Specifically, after surveying the literature on Berkeley's master argument in Chapter I of this study, Chapter II interprets the master argument as an argument from meaning which purports to prove meaningless the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds. And in the course of developing this interpretation, Chapter II of this study analyzes the treatment of meaning which appears in the master argument's context in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge. Chapter III of this study, in turn, argues that, when interpreted as an argument from meaning, Berkeley's master argument avoids a common objection to it in the literature---i.e., that if it impugns the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds, it also rules out Berkeley's claiming that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of his mind. The fourth chapter of this study argues that unbeknownst to commentators, at least part of Berkeley's well-known critique of abstract ideas represents an argument from meaning. Finally, this study's appendix argues that the first two of Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous represent an argument from meaning as well.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:20:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3199175.pdf: 3720990 bytes, checksum: 8cc6a103b1fe08f1b245f7f8cb3d3d3c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 88876 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","167 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Berkeley's Master Argument: Its Form and Implications"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["McKim, Robert"],"dc:creator":["Williams, Reginald"],"dc:date":["2015-09-28T16:20:49Z","10000-01-01","2005"],"dc:description":["This study presents a new interpretation of Berkeley's 'master argument', which challenges the materialist to 'conceive it possible' that even one perceptible object (e.g., a tree or an idea) exists 'independently' of all minds. Specifically, after surveying the literature on Berkeley's master argument in Chapter I of this study, Chapter II interprets the master argument as an argument from meaning which purports to prove meaningless the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds. And in the course of developing this interpretation, Chapter II of this study analyzes the treatment of meaning which appears in the master argument's context in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge. Chapter III of this study, in turn, argues that, when interpreted as an argument from meaning, Berkeley's master argument avoids a common objection to it in the literature---i.e., that if it impugns the materialist's claim that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of all minds, it also rules out Berkeley's claiming that even one perceptible object exists 'independently' of his mind. The fourth chapter of this study argues that unbeknownst to commentators, at least part of Berkeley's well-known critique of abstract ideas represents an argument from meaning. Finally, this study's appendix argues that the first two of Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous represent an argument from meaning as well.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:20:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3199175.pdf: 3720990 bytes, checksum: 8cc6a103b1fe08f1b245f7f8cb3d3d3c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 88876 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","167 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87595","(MiAaPQ)AAI3199175"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy"],"dc:title":["Berkeley's Master Argument: Its Form and Implications"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:30Z"}