Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies

This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Grantor

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Year dc:date

2015

Author dc:creator

• Kim, Deuk-Won

Contributors dc:contributor

• Yannelis, Nicholas C.

• Economics, Theory

Language dc:language

eng

Identifier

(MiAaPQ)AAI3337819

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85592