{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85592"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85592","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies","abstract":"This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.","abstract_html":"This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kim, Deuk-Won"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Yannelis, Nicholas C."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T22:47:31Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T22:47:31Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z","subjects":["Economics, Theory"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3337819"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3337819","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85592","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Yannelis, Nicholas C."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kim, Deuk-Won"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T22:47:31Z","10000-01-01","2008"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics, Theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85592","(MiAaPQ)AAI3337819"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3337819.pdf: 609467 bytes, checksum: 802c290fb0307df8a6f55c2352628531 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86873 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","41 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Yannelis, Nicholas C."],"dc:creator":["Kim, Deuk-Won"],"dc:date":["2015-09-25T22:47:31Z","10000-01-01","2008"],"dc:description":["This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3337819.pdf: 609467 bytes, checksum: 802c290fb0307df8a6f55c2352628531 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86873 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","41 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85592","(MiAaPQ)AAI3337819"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Economics, Theory"],"dc:title":["Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z"}