An Essay on the Ontology of Reasons

<p>I argue that many recent anti-psychologistic accounts of agential reasons are unsatisfactory. I also argue that psychologistic accounts are false. Then I develop and defend an anti-psychologistic, propositionalist theory of reasons whereby agential reasons are propositions. I also develop a corresponding anti-psychologistic account of reason-explanation that is able to help resolve some of the more difficult problems for theories of anti-psychologism. Next, I argue for a Russellian theory of propositionalism. Finally, I argue against teleological theories of reasons.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Year

2012

Author dc:creator

• Dickinson, Jeremy Anon

Contributors dc:contributor

• Mark Heller

• Motivating Reasons
• Anti-Psychologism
• Psychologism
• Propositionalism
• Philosophy

Repository record dc:identifier

https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd/69

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:surface.syr.edu:phi_etd-1076