I argue that many recent anti-psychologistic accounts of agential reasons are unsatisfactory. I also argue that psychologistic accounts are false. Then I develop and defend an anti-psychologistic, propositionalist theory of reasons whereby agential reasons are propositions. I also develop a corresponding anti-psychologistic account of reason-explanation that is able to help resolve some of the more difficult problems for theories of anti-psychologism. Next, I argue for a Russellian theory of propositionalism. Finally, I argue against teleological theories of reasons.","abstract_html":"<p>I argue that many recent anti-psychologistic accounts of agential reasons are unsatisfactory. I also argue that psychologistic accounts are false. Then I develop and defend an anti-psychologistic, propositionalist theory of reasons whereby agential reasons are propositions. I also develop a corresponding anti-psychologistic account of reason-explanation that is able to help resolve some of the more difficult problems for theories of anti-psychologism. Next, I argue for a Russellian theory of propositionalism. Finally, I argue against teleological theories of reasons.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dickinson, Jeremy Anon"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Mark Heller"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-06-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2012-06-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:54:17Z","subjects":["Motivating Reasons","Anti-Psychologism","Psychologism","Propositionalism","Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd/69","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Mark Heller"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dickinson, Jeremy Anon"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Motivating Reasons","Anti-Psychologism","Psychologism","Propositionalism","Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd/69"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["
I argue that many recent anti-psychologistic accounts of agential reasons are unsatisfactory. I also argue that psychologistic accounts are false. Then I develop and defend an anti-psychologistic, propositionalist theory of reasons whereby agential reasons are propositions. I also develop a corresponding anti-psychologistic account of reason-explanation that is able to help resolve some of the more difficult problems for theories of anti-psychologism. Next, I argue for a Russellian theory of propositionalism. Finally, I argue against teleological theories of reasons."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["An Essay on the Ontology of Reasons"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Mark Heller"],"dc:creator":["Dickinson, Jeremy Anon"],"dc:description.abstract":["
I argue that many recent anti-psychologistic accounts of agential reasons are unsatisfactory. I also argue that psychologistic accounts are false. Then I develop and defend an anti-psychologistic, propositionalist theory of reasons whereby agential reasons are propositions. I also develop a corresponding anti-psychologistic account of reason-explanation that is able to help resolve some of the more difficult problems for theories of anti-psychologism. Next, I argue for a Russellian theory of propositionalism. Finally, I argue against teleological theories of reasons."],"dc:identifier":["https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd/69"],"dc:subject":["Motivating Reasons","Anti-Psychologism","Psychologism","Propositionalism","Philosophy"],"dc:title":["An Essay on the Ontology of Reasons"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T04:54:17Z"}