Kataleptic impression and the problem of justification

In this thesis, I have reconstructed the centuries-long debate regarding the criterion of truth, arguing that the conflict between the Stoics and the Academy cannot be fully resolved through the binary lens of contemporary epistemic internalism and externalism alone. By tracing the historical evolution of the kataleptic impression from Zeno to Chrysippus, and re-evaluating the nature of the Academic objections, I have attempted to demonstrate that the core of this dispute was not merely epistemological, but fundamentally metaphysical. In the first chapter, I choose to understand the criterion problem within a broader Platonic context. While Zeno initiated the doctrine of the kataleptic impression as a conceptualist revision of Plato’s distrust of perception, the school’s internal development reveals a significant shift afterwards. In the second chapter, I argue that Cleanthes’ definition of the impression as a passive imprint on the soul creates a justification deficit. As a passive outcome of a physical process, Cleanthes’ impression cannot guarantee a connection to external reality without invoking internal, subject-accessible features, effectively forcing an internalist reading that renders the Stoic position vulnerable to skeptical regress. However, the significant turn in Stoic epistemology and the defense of an externalist reading lie in Chrysippus’ revision. By redefining the impression as an alteration and utilizing the analogy of light, Chrysippus moved beyond the passive wax-imprint model. I argue that Chrysippus grounded the warranty of truth not in phenomenological introspection, but in the reliable, active causal process of the pneuma. For the mature Stoic, the ruling mind is not a passive recipient but a principal cause that actively grasps the object. This establishes a robust externalist justification: the truth is guaranteed by the psychophysical connection between the rational soul and the rational structure of the universe, regardless of whether the subject is reflectively aware of this mechanism in every instance. This externalist conclusion raises the critical problem addressed in the final section: if the Stoics were externalists, did the Academic arguments based on indistinguishability simply miss their target? I argue against the view that the Academics merely misunderstood Stoic doctrine. Instead, I propose a distinction between two types of indistinguishability arguments. While the first synchronic argument attacks the phenomenological distinctiveness of impressions, the second diachronic argument, exemplified by the case of the snake, strikes deeper. Carneades’ critique does not merely demand an internal mark of truth. It targets the ontological foundation of Stoic dogmatism. The Stoic externalist guarantee relies on the existence of the peculiarly qualified individual, which is a metaphysical quality that persists through change and uniquely causes the kataleptic impression. By questioning our ability to track identity over time, Carneades attempted to sever the link between the impression and this ontological substrate. Therefore, the endurance of this debate is not only a result of the Stoics ignoring internalist demands, but also of a profound clash between the Stoics and the skeptics on metaphysics.

Author dc:creator

• LI ZHIMING

• Θετικές Επιστήμες
• Science

Language dc:language

English

Identifier

uoadl:5367909

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:lib.uoa.gr:uoadl:5367909