I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics, undercutting some of the evidence for retributive theories of punishment. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger, its relation to psychological traits of other animals, and its influence on action. First, I offer a tentative evolutionary story about anger that can explain retributive intuitions concerning punishment. This explanation undercuts these intuitions as evidence for retributive beliefs by showing that they were selected for their biological consequences rather than their accuracy (concerning the value of retributive punishment). I develop the evolutionary explanation by raising and resolving three additional problems. First, prominent evolutionary explanations of retributive motives fall short because they appeal to models that apply only to organisms with strategic foresight. To mitigate this problem, I appeal to an economic model of resource competition, which applies to organisms without strategic foresight. This model also explains several features of an aggression system in rodents. Second, I show that human anger derives from the same ancestral trait as this aggression system. Finally, the continuity of anger across human and nonhuman animals stands in tension with the idea that anger causes purposive behavior like retribution or retaliation. I argue that differences between the angry behaviors of human and nonhuman animals are differences in degree and not in kind.
","abstract_html":"<p>I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics, undercutting some of the evidence for retributive theories of punishment. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger, its relation to psychological traits of other animals, and its influence on action. First, I offer a tentative evolutionary story about anger that can explain retributive intuitions concerning punishment. This explanation undercuts these intuitions as evidence for retributive beliefs by showing that they were selected for their biological consequences rather than their accuracy (concerning the value of retributive punishment). I develop the evolutionary explanation by raising and resolving three additional problems. First, prominent evolutionary explanations of retributive motives fall short because they appeal to models that apply only to organisms with strategic foresight. To mitigate this problem, I appeal to an economic model of resource competition, which applies to organisms without strategic foresight. This model also explains several features of an aggression system in rodents. Second, I show that human anger derives from the same ancestral trait as this aggression system. Finally, the continuity of anger across human and nonhuman animals stands in tension with the idea that anger causes purposive behavior like retribution or retaliation. I argue that differences between the angry behaviors of human and nonhuman animals are differences in degree and not in kind.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Wiegman, Isaac Thane"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Ron Mallon"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-09-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2014-09-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:32Z","subjects":["Anger","Emotion","Evolutionary Moral Psychology","Homology","Punishment","Retribution"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7X34VJP"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7X34VJP","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7X34VJP","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1364","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Ron Mallon"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Wiegman, Isaac Thane"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-10-08T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Anger","Emotion","Evolutionary Moral Psychology","Homology","Punishment","Retribution"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1364"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7X34VJP"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics, undercutting some of the evidence for retributive theories of punishment. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger, its relation to psychological traits of other animals, and its influence on action. First, I offer a tentative evolutionary story about anger that can explain retributive intuitions concerning punishment. This explanation undercuts these intuitions as evidence for retributive beliefs by showing that they were selected for their biological consequences rather than their accuracy (concerning the value of retributive punishment). I develop the evolutionary explanation by raising and resolving three additional problems. First, prominent evolutionary explanations of retributive motives fall short because they appeal to models that apply only to organisms with strategic foresight. To mitigate this problem, I appeal to an economic model of resource competition, which applies to organisms without strategic foresight. This model also explains several features of an aggression system in rodents. Second, I show that human anger derives from the same ancestral trait as this aggression system. Finally, the continuity of anger across human and nonhuman animals stands in tension with the idea that anger causes purposive behavior like retribution or retaliation. I argue that differences between the angry behaviors of human and nonhuman animals are differences in degree and not in kind.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Anger and Punishment: Natural History and Normative Significance"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Ron Mallon"],"dc:creator":["Wiegman, Isaac Thane"],"dc:date.available":["2014-10-08T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics, undercutting some of the evidence for retributive theories of punishment. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger, its relation to psychological traits of other animals, and its influence on action. First, I offer a tentative evolutionary story about anger that can explain retributive intuitions concerning punishment. This explanation undercuts these intuitions as evidence for retributive beliefs by showing that they were selected for their biological consequences rather than their accuracy (concerning the value of retributive punishment). I develop the evolutionary explanation by raising and resolving three additional problems. First, prominent evolutionary explanations of retributive motives fall short because they appeal to models that apply only to organisms with strategic foresight. To mitigate this problem, I appeal to an economic model of resource competition, which applies to organisms without strategic foresight. This model also explains several features of an aggression system in rodents. Second, I show that human anger derives from the same ancestral trait as this aggression system. Finally, the continuity of anger across human and nonhuman animals stands in tension with the idea that anger causes purposive behavior like retribution or retaliation. I argue that differences between the angry behaviors of human and nonhuman animals are differences in degree and not in kind.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1364"],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7X34VJP"],"dc:language":["English (en)"],"dc:subject":["Anger","Emotion","Evolutionary Moral Psychology","Homology","Punishment","Retribution"],"dc:title":["Anger and Punishment: Natural History and Normative Significance"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:32Z"}