In this dissertation I examine the normative implications of different motivational strategies when applied to address the behavioral obstacles of various redistributive schemes, in particular, in the case of income redistribution policies and the provision of essential services. I intend to show that negative inducements can have some advantages with reference to other motivational instruments. For example, negative inducements are often the main motivational strategies behind conditional welfare policies. I argue against the view that conditional welfare policies are always hostile to the poor and the less fortunate. Moreover, I explain why redistributive schemes whose benefits are tied to specified patterns of behavior do not necessarily constitute a betrayal of progressive ideals. I defend the claim that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in setting behavioral conditions on aid, although care must be taken in doing so. This is against the view that unconditional welfare policies are less normatively troubling than conditional ones since the former impose fewer or no behavioral conditions on their recipients.
","abstract_html":"<p>In this dissertation I examine the normative implications of different motivational strategies when applied to address the behavioral obstacles of various redistributive schemes, in particular, in the case of income redistribution policies and the provision of essential services. I intend to show that negative inducements can have some advantages with reference to other motivational instruments. For example, negative inducements are often the main motivational strategies behind conditional welfare policies. I argue against the view that conditional welfare policies are always hostile to the poor and the less fortunate. Moreover, I explain why redistributive schemes whose benefits are tied to specified patterns of behavior do not necessarily constitute a betrayal of progressive ideals. I defend the claim that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in setting behavioral conditions on aid, although care must be taken in doing so. This is against the view that unconditional welfare policies are less normatively troubling than conditional ones since the former impose fewer or no behavioral conditions on their recipients.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Perez, Cristian"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Frank Lovett"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-09-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2014-09-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:13:40Z","subjects":["Distributive justice","Motivational strategies","Redistributive policies","Welfare policies"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K70G3H80"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K70G3H80","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K70G3H80","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1332","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Frank Lovett"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Perez, Cristian"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-10-07T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Distributive justice","Motivational strategies","Redistributive policies","Welfare policies"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1332"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K70G3H80"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In this dissertation I examine the normative implications of different motivational strategies when applied to address the behavioral obstacles of various redistributive schemes, in particular, in the case of income redistribution policies and the provision of essential services. I intend to show that negative inducements can have some advantages with reference to other motivational instruments. For example, negative inducements are often the main motivational strategies behind conditional welfare policies. I argue against the view that conditional welfare policies are always hostile to the poor and the less fortunate. Moreover, I explain why redistributive schemes whose benefits are tied to specified patterns of behavior do not necessarily constitute a betrayal of progressive ideals. I defend the claim that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in setting behavioral conditions on aid, although care must be taken in doing so. This is against the view that unconditional welfare policies are less normatively troubling than conditional ones since the former impose fewer or no behavioral conditions on their recipients.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Motivational Strategies, Conditional Welfare and Distributive Justice"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Frank Lovett"],"dc:creator":["Perez, Cristian"],"dc:date.available":["2016-10-07T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["In this dissertation I examine the normative implications of different motivational strategies when applied to address the behavioral obstacles of various redistributive schemes, in particular, in the case of income redistribution policies and the provision of essential services. I intend to show that negative inducements can have some advantages with reference to other motivational instruments. For example, negative inducements are often the main motivational strategies behind conditional welfare policies. I argue against the view that conditional welfare policies are always hostile to the poor and the less fortunate. Moreover, I explain why redistributive schemes whose benefits are tied to specified patterns of behavior do not necessarily constitute a betrayal of progressive ideals. I defend the claim that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in setting behavioral conditions on aid, although care must be taken in doing so. This is against the view that unconditional welfare policies are less normatively troubling than conditional ones since the former impose fewer or no behavioral conditions on their recipients.
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