This dissertation studies self-referential games in which agents can learn (perfectly and imperfectly) about an opponents' intentions from a private signal. In the first chapter, my main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of an opponent's code of conduct and indirect observation of the same opponent's play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information I prove a folk theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of self-referentiality on bad reputation games in which the long-run player must choose specific actions to make short-run players participate in the game. Since these particular actions could be interpreted as evidence of perverse behavior, the long-run agent attempts to separate himself from other types and this results in efficiency losses. When players identify intentions perfectly, I show that inefficiencies and reputational concerns due to a bad reputation disappear. In the case of imperfect observation, I find that self-referentiality and stochastic renewal of the long-run player together overcome inefficiencies because of bad reputation. In the third chapter, I address the timing of signals in self-referential games. These models typically suppose that intentions are divined in a pre-play phase; however, in many applications this may not be the case. For games with perfect information when players observe signals in advance, I show that any subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential finite-horizon approximation of the original game. Then, I focus on two specific classes of games. First, in finitely repeated games with discounting I show that a version of the folk theorem holds regardless of the time at which signals are observed. Second, I examine exit games in which players can terminate the game at any stage. In contrast to repeated games, I find that the equilibrium outcome of the self-referential exit game is unique if signals arrive after the first stage, whereas a folk theorem results only if they occur before the first stage. Finally, I explore asynchronous monitoring of intentions where players may not receive signals simultaneously. With asynchronicity, a folk theorem continues to apply for repeated games; however, for exit games there is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of signal timing, or indeed, independent of having a signal.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation studies self-referential games in which agents can learn (perfectly and imperfectly) about an opponents' intentions from a private signal. In the first chapter, my main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of an opponent's code of conduct and indirect observation of the same opponent's play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information I prove a folk theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of self-referentiality on bad reputation games in which the long-run player must choose specific actions to make short-run players participate in the game. Since these particular actions could be interpreted as evidence of perverse behavior, the long-run agent attempts to separate himself from other types and this results in efficiency losses. When players identify intentions perfectly, I show that inefficiencies and reputational concerns due to a bad reputation disappear. In the case of imperfect observation, I find that self-referentiality and stochastic renewal of the long-run player together overcome inefficiencies because of bad reputation. In the third chapter, I address the timing of signals in self-referential games. These models typically suppose that intentions are divined in a pre-play phase; however, in many applications this may not be the case. For games with perfect information when players observe signals in advance, I show that any subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential finite-horizon approximation of the original game. Then, I focus on two specific classes of games. First, in finitely repeated games with discounting I show that a version of the folk theorem holds regardless of the time at which signals are observed. Second, I examine exit games in which players can terminate the game at any stage. In contrast to repeated games, I find that the equilibrium outcome of the self-referential exit game is unique if signals arrive after the first stage, whereas a folk theorem results only if they occur before the first stage. Finally, I explore asynchronous monitoring of intentions where players may not receive signals simultaneously. With asynchronicity, a folk theorem continues to apply for repeated games; however, for exit games there is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of signal timing, or indeed, independent of having a signal.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Block, Juan Ignacio"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["David K Levine"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-04-25T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2014-04-25T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:58Z","subjects":[],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7NK3C31"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7NK3C31","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7NK3C31","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1220","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["David K Levine"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Block, Juan Ignacio"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-27T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1220"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7NK3C31"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation studies self-referential games in which agents can learn (perfectly and imperfectly) about an opponents' intentions from a private signal. In the first chapter, my main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of an opponent's code of conduct and indirect observation of the same opponent's play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information I prove a folk theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of self-referentiality on bad reputation games in which the long-run player must choose specific actions to make short-run players participate in the game. Since these particular actions could be interpreted as evidence of perverse behavior, the long-run agent attempts to separate himself from other types and this results in efficiency losses. When players identify intentions perfectly, I show that inefficiencies and reputational concerns due to a bad reputation disappear. In the case of imperfect observation, I find that self-referentiality and stochastic renewal of the long-run player together overcome inefficiencies because of bad reputation. In the third chapter, I address the timing of signals in self-referential games. These models typically suppose that intentions are divined in a pre-play phase; however, in many applications this may not be the case. For games with perfect information when players observe signals in advance, I show that any subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential finite-horizon approximation of the original game. Then, I focus on two specific classes of games. First, in finitely repeated games with discounting I show that a version of the folk theorem holds regardless of the time at which signals are observed. Second, I examine exit games in which players can terminate the game at any stage. In contrast to repeated games, I find that the equilibrium outcome of the self-referential exit game is unique if signals arrive after the first stage, whereas a folk theorem results only if they occur before the first stage. Finally, I explore asynchronous monitoring of intentions where players may not receive signals simultaneously. With asynchronicity, a folk theorem continues to apply for repeated games; however, for exit games there is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of signal timing, or indeed, independent of having a signal.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on Self-Referential Games"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["David K Levine"],"dc:creator":["Block, Juan Ignacio"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-27T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation studies self-referential games in which agents can learn (perfectly and imperfectly) about an opponents' intentions from a private signal. In the first chapter, my main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of an opponent's code of conduct and indirect observation of the same opponent's play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information I prove a folk theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of self-referentiality on bad reputation games in which the long-run player must choose specific actions to make short-run players participate in the game. Since these particular actions could be interpreted as evidence of perverse behavior, the long-run agent attempts to separate himself from other types and this results in efficiency losses. When players identify intentions perfectly, I show that inefficiencies and reputational concerns due to a bad reputation disappear. In the case of imperfect observation, I find that self-referentiality and stochastic renewal of the long-run player together overcome inefficiencies because of bad reputation. In the third chapter, I address the timing of signals in self-referential games. These models typically suppose that intentions are divined in a pre-play phase; however, in many applications this may not be the case. For games with perfect information when players observe signals in advance, I show that any subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential finite-horizon approximation of the original game. Then, I focus on two specific classes of games. First, in finitely repeated games with discounting I show that a version of the folk theorem holds regardless of the time at which signals are observed. Second, I examine exit games in which players can terminate the game at any stage. In contrast to repeated games, I find that the equilibrium outcome of the self-referential exit game is unique if signals arrive after the first stage, whereas a folk theorem results only if they occur before the first stage. Finally, I explore asynchronous monitoring of intentions where players may not receive signals simultaneously. With asynchronicity, a folk theorem continues to apply for repeated games; however, for exit games there is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of signal timing, or indeed, independent of having a signal.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1220"],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7NK3C31"],"dc:language":["English (en)"],"dc:title":["Essays on Self-Referential Games"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:58Z"}