This dissertation examines the effect of external actors, including foreign investors, the home governments of foreign investors, and international organizations: IOs), on leadership survival in resource rich countries. According to the existing literature, resource rich countries care less about external reputation and have a higher level of political risks for foreign investors, so, theoretically, they would tend to nationalize the resource sectors, especially in the presence of resource nationalism. In reality, however, resource rich countries cooperate closely with foreign actors and join IOs that constrain themselves. This dissertation provides a theory to explain this puzzle, by modeling the interaction among foreign actors, the leaders of resource rich countries, and the domestic opposition. It argues that leaders of resource rich countries tend to maintain a close friendship with powerful foreign countries, not only because resource rich countries have strategic or economic importance, but also because they by nature face a higher level of revolutionary threat. By providing support to leaders who are friends of theirs, which depresses the opposition, foreign actors help the leaders of resource rich countries to stay in power. An empirical analysis on oil ownership and leadership turnover shows that a leader is more likely to survive when the oil is foreign owned. There are several foreign policy tools that foreign actors can use to assist the leaders, including military intervention, foreign aid, and support from IOs. Membership in IOs also has a similar effect on leadership survival, because IOs can legitimize the leaders and cover their unpopular activities.
","abstract_html":"<p>This dissertation examines the effect of external actors, including foreign investors, the home governments of foreign investors, and international organizations: IOs), on leadership survival in resource rich countries. According to the existing literature, resource rich countries care less about external reputation and have a higher level of political risks for foreign investors, so, theoretically, they would tend to nationalize the resource sectors, especially in the presence of resource nationalism. In reality, however, resource rich countries cooperate closely with foreign actors and join IOs that constrain themselves. This dissertation provides a theory to explain this puzzle, by modeling the interaction among foreign actors, the leaders of resource rich countries, and the domestic opposition. It argues that leaders of resource rich countries tend to maintain a close friendship with powerful foreign countries, not only because resource rich countries have strategic or economic importance, but also because they by nature face a higher level of revolutionary threat. By providing support to leaders who are friends of theirs, which depresses the opposition, foreign actors help the leaders of resource rich countries to stay in power. An empirical analysis on oil ownership and leadership turnover shows that a leader is more likely to survive when the oil is foreign owned. There are several foreign policy tools that foreign actors can use to assist the leaders, including military intervention, foreign aid, and support from IOs. Membership in IOs also has a similar effect on leadership survival, because IOs can legitimize the leaders and cover their unpopular activities.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lee, Chia-yi"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Nathan M Jensen"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-12-19T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2013-12-19T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:58Z","subjects":["Foreign direct investment","International organizations","Natural resources","Political survival","Political Science"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7N58JGS"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7N58JGS","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7N58JGS","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1203","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Nathan M Jensen"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lee, Chia-yi"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-01-16T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Foreign direct investment","International organizations","Natural resources","Political survival","Political Science"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1203"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7N58JGS"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation examines the effect of external actors, including foreign investors, the home governments of foreign investors, and international organizations: IOs), on leadership survival in resource rich countries. According to the existing literature, resource rich countries care less about external reputation and have a higher level of political risks for foreign investors, so, theoretically, they would tend to nationalize the resource sectors, especially in the presence of resource nationalism. In reality, however, resource rich countries cooperate closely with foreign actors and join IOs that constrain themselves. This dissertation provides a theory to explain this puzzle, by modeling the interaction among foreign actors, the leaders of resource rich countries, and the domestic opposition. It argues that leaders of resource rich countries tend to maintain a close friendship with powerful foreign countries, not only because resource rich countries have strategic or economic importance, but also because they by nature face a higher level of revolutionary threat. By providing support to leaders who are friends of theirs, which depresses the opposition, foreign actors help the leaders of resource rich countries to stay in power. An empirical analysis on oil ownership and leadership turnover shows that a leader is more likely to survive when the oil is foreign owned. There are several foreign policy tools that foreign actors can use to assist the leaders, including military intervention, foreign aid, and support from IOs. Membership in IOs also has a similar effect on leadership survival, because IOs can legitimize the leaders and cover their unpopular activities.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Globalization of Natural Resources: How External Actors Affect Political Survival in Resource Rich Countries"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Nathan M Jensen"],"dc:creator":["Lee, Chia-yi"],"dc:date.available":["2016-01-16T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation examines the effect of external actors, including foreign investors, the home governments of foreign investors, and international organizations: IOs), on leadership survival in resource rich countries. According to the existing literature, resource rich countries care less about external reputation and have a higher level of political risks for foreign investors, so, theoretically, they would tend to nationalize the resource sectors, especially in the presence of resource nationalism. In reality, however, resource rich countries cooperate closely with foreign actors and join IOs that constrain themselves. This dissertation provides a theory to explain this puzzle, by modeling the interaction among foreign actors, the leaders of resource rich countries, and the domestic opposition. It argues that leaders of resource rich countries tend to maintain a close friendship with powerful foreign countries, not only because resource rich countries have strategic or economic importance, but also because they by nature face a higher level of revolutionary threat. By providing support to leaders who are friends of theirs, which depresses the opposition, foreign actors help the leaders of resource rich countries to stay in power. An empirical analysis on oil ownership and leadership turnover shows that a leader is more likely to survive when the oil is foreign owned. There are several foreign policy tools that foreign actors can use to assist the leaders, including military intervention, foreign aid, and support from IOs. Membership in IOs also has a similar effect on leadership survival, because IOs can legitimize the leaders and cover their unpopular activities.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1203"],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7N58JGS"],"dc:language":["English (en)"],"dc:subject":["Foreign direct investment","International organizations","Natural resources","Political survival","Political Science"],"dc:title":["The Globalization of Natural Resources: How External Actors Affect Political Survival in Resource Rich Countries"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Political Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:58Z"}