Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism

<p>This dissertation provides a novel argument from disagreement against moral realism. Moral anti-realists have long suspected that something about the scope and/or nature of moral disagreement threatens moral realism, but existing arguments are either unsound, or rely upon premises which are too question-begging to anyone who does not already share anti-realist metaethical sympathies. This dissertation contends that moral anti-realism provides the best explanation of our view that we ought to hold onto our moral judgments in the face of disagreement about them. It contends that the most plausible view in the epistemology of disagreement tells us that, were our moral judgments the sorts of beliefs that the moral realist says they are, we should drop many of them in the face of disagreement about them which we encounter with people whom we have reason to trust. But we frequently judge that we should not do this. Moral anti-realism is the best explanation of this fact.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Year dc:date.available

2013

Author dc:creator

• Turner, Martin

Contributors dc:contributor

• Eric Brown

• Epistemology of Disagreement
• Moral Anti-Realism
• Moral Disagreement
• Moral Realism
• Philosophy

Language dc:language

English (en)

DOI

https://doi.org/10.7936/K79C6VJM

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-2099