{"id":{"repo_id":"wustl","oai_identifier":"oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-1565"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/wustl/oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:etd-1565","repository":{"repo_id":"wustl","name":"Washington University in St. Louis","base_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"A Marginal Returns Theory of Politics","abstract":"A great deal of contemporary social science rests on a basic, ``primitive'', principle that rational agents are motivated by a quest for marginal returns to investment of time, money, and other resources. In this manuscript we argue that an analogue fundamental principle guides much of modern political science, but has remained largely This manuscript sets out to unearth, reshape and polish this principle into what we term a marginal return theory of politics. We then apply this theory to the study of electioneering in Latin America, focusing on two main elements of vote seeking: the returns of specific votes and the returns of specific voters. We provide evidence that political parties are keenly aware of how differences in the returns of specific votes and specific voters affect their future plans to hold on top power. As such, these parties go out of their way to ensure that party exchanges prioritize the right votes being cast by the right voters.","abstract_html":"A great deal of contemporary social science rests on a basic, ``primitive'', principle that rational agents are motivated by a quest for marginal returns to investment of time, money, and other resources. In this manuscript we argue that an analogue fundamental principle guides much of modern political science, but has remained largely This manuscript sets out to unearth, reshape and polish this principle into what we term a marginal return theory of politics. We then apply this theory to the study of electioneering in Latin America, focusing on two main elements of vote seeking: the returns of specific votes and the returns of specific voters. We provide evidence that political parties are keenly aware of how differences in the returns of specific votes and specific voters affect their future plans to hold on top power. As such, these parties go out of their way to ensure that party exchanges prioritize the right votes being cast by the right voters.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Costa, Carlos"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Itai Sened"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2011-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:13:23Z","subjects":["Political Science","comparative politics","development","electoral rules","institutions","redistribution"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7KD1W17"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7KD1W17","href":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7KD1W17","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/566","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Itai Sened"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Costa, Carlos"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2012-05-17T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Political Science","comparative politics","development","electoral rules","institutions","redistribution"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/566"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7KD1W17"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["A great deal of contemporary social science rests on a basic, ``primitive'', principle that rational agents are motivated by a quest for marginal returns to investment of time, money, and other resources. In this manuscript we argue that an analogue fundamental principle guides much of modern political science, but has remained largely This manuscript sets out to unearth, reshape and polish this principle into what we term a marginal return theory of politics. We then apply this theory to the study of electioneering in Latin America, focusing on two main elements of vote seeking: the returns of specific votes and the returns of specific voters. We provide evidence that political parties are keenly aware of how differences in the returns of specific votes and specific voters affect their future plans to hold on top power. 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We then apply this theory to the study of electioneering in Latin America, focusing on two main elements of vote seeking: the returns of specific votes and the returns of specific voters. We provide evidence that political parties are keenly aware of how differences in the returns of specific votes and specific voters affect their future plans to hold on top power. 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