The Politics of the American Policymaking System

Most public policy is developed and implemented by the federal bureaucracy. The possibility of unelected bureaucrats subverting the wishes of popularly elected political principals threatens to sever democratic control of policy by the populace. Through a series of essays, this dissertation explores the opportunities and limitations of one form of bureaucratic control: ex post political oversight by a third-party. Through a series of formal models I illustrate how oversight, such as judicial or executive review of agency actions, structures the policymaking incentives of bureaucratic agencies. The way oversight affects agency behavior, in turn, structures incentives for political principals to design and sustain politically biased policymaking agencies in exchange for higher quality policy promulgation. Overall, the results illustrate the good and bad sides of political oversight and how it can be leveraged to inform several important issues of institutional design. The results suggest paths to improve bureaucratic motivational strategies by administrators.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Political Science

Year dc:date.available

2015

Author dc:creator

• Turner, Ian R.

Contributors dc:contributor

• John W Patty
• Elizabeth Maggie Penn, Randall Calvert, Gary J Miller, Justin Fox, Brian W Rogers

• bureaucracy
• courts
• formal theory
• game theory
• intergovernmental relations
• oversight
• Political Science

Statement dc:rights

• I have not registered my thesis with the U.S. Copyright Office, and do not intend to.

Language dc:language

English (en)

Identifier

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/477

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:art_sci_etds-1477