{"id":{"repo_id":"wustl","oai_identifier":"oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:art_sci_etds-1459"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/wustl/oai:openscholarship.wustl.edu:art_sci_etds-1459","repository":{"repo_id":"wustl","name":"Washington University in St. Louis","base_url":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Paradigmatic Self-Deception","abstract":"I present a theory of what I call \"paradigmatic self-deception,\" the most serious and vivid cases of self-deception. While there has been much philosophical discussion of self-deception in recent decades, existing work does not explain how and why some cases of self-deception are more severe than others, when self-deception is intentional, and when an individual may justifiably be held morally responsible for being self-deceived. This dissertation answers all three of these important questions. The first chapter reviews the existing literature and motivates the need for a theory of paradigmatic cases. In the second chapter, I introduce three characteristic features of paradigmatic cases as revealed in the particular case of the Mitt Romney campaign's self-deception during the 2012 presidential election. Next, the third chapter explores how paradigmatic cases of self-deception are plausibly intentional, drawing on the empirical literature on attention and mindfulness meditation to argue that in paradigmatic cases self-deceivers make sophisticated use of attentional capacities to sustain their false beliefs and that the intentions under which these capacities are deployed are relevant to self-deception in a way that makes the overall activity of self-deception intentional. Finally, in the last chapter I claim that paradigmatic cases involve culpable ignorance, which I reduce to a kind of negligence: because the paradigmatically self-deceived are negligent, we can hold them morally responsible.","abstract_html":"I present a theory of what I call "paradigmatic self-deception," the most serious and vivid cases of self-deception. While there has been much philosophical discussion of self-deception in recent decades, existing work does not explain how and why some cases of self-deception are more severe than others, when self-deception is intentional, and when an individual may justifiably be held morally responsible for being self-deceived. This dissertation answers all three of these important questions. The first chapter reviews the existing literature and motivates the need for a theory of paradigmatic cases. In the second chapter, I introduce three characteristic features of paradigmatic cases as revealed in the particular case of the Mitt Romney campaign's self-deception during the 2012 presidential election. Next, the third chapter explores how paradigmatic cases of self-deception are plausibly intentional, drawing on the empirical literature on attention and mindfulness meditation to argue that in paradigmatic cases self-deceivers make sophisticated use of attentional capacities to sustain their false beliefs and that the intentions under which these capacities are deployed are relevant to self-deception in a way that makes the overall activity of self-deception intentional. Finally, in the last chapter I claim that paradigmatic cases involve culpable ignorance, which I reduce to a kind of negligence: because the paradigmatically self-deceived are negligent, we can hold them morally responsible.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Winchell, David Stephen"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["John M Doris","Eric Brown, Ron Mallon, Dan Haybron, John Heil"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-05-15T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2015-05-15T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:08Z","subjects":["attention","intention","moral responsibility","negligence","self-deception","Philosophy"],"languages":["English (en)"],"rights":["I have not registered my thesis with the U.S. Copyright Office, and do not intend to."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/459"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/459","href":"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/459","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.7936/K7R78CBJ","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["John M Doris","Eric Brown, Ron Mallon, Dan Haybron, John Heil"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Winchell, David Stephen"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2017-04-28T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy","Graduate School of Arts and Sciences"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["attention","intention","moral responsibility","negligence","self-deception","Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English (en)"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["I have not registered my thesis with the U.S. Copyright Office, and do not intend to."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7R78CBJ","https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/459"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.7936/K7R78CBJ"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I present a theory of what I call \"paradigmatic self-deception,\" the most serious and vivid cases of self-deception. While there has been much philosophical discussion of self-deception in recent decades, existing work does not explain how and why some cases of self-deception are more severe than others, when self-deception is intentional, and when an individual may justifiably be held morally responsible for being self-deceived. This dissertation answers all three of these important questions. The first chapter reviews the existing literature and motivates the need for a theory of paradigmatic cases. In the second chapter, I introduce three characteristic features of paradigmatic cases as revealed in the particular case of the Mitt Romney campaign's self-deception during the 2012 presidential election. Next, the third chapter explores how paradigmatic cases of self-deception are plausibly intentional, drawing on the empirical literature on attention and mindfulness meditation to argue that in paradigmatic cases self-deceivers make sophisticated use of attentional capacities to sustain their false beliefs and that the intentions under which these capacities are deployed are relevant to self-deception in a way that makes the overall activity of self-deception intentional. Finally, in the last chapter I claim that paradigmatic cases involve culpable ignorance, which I reduce to a kind of negligence: because the paradigmatically self-deceived are negligent, we can hold them morally responsible."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Paradigmatic Self-Deception"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["John M Doris","Eric Brown, Ron Mallon, Dan Haybron, John Heil"],"dc:creator":["Winchell, David Stephen"],"dc:date.available":["2017-04-28T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.7936/K7R78CBJ"],"dc:description.abstract":["I present a theory of what I call \"paradigmatic self-deception,\" the most serious and vivid cases of self-deception. While there has been much philosophical discussion of self-deception in recent decades, existing work does not explain how and why some cases of self-deception are more severe than others, when self-deception is intentional, and when an individual may justifiably be held morally responsible for being self-deceived. This dissertation answers all three of these important questions. The first chapter reviews the existing literature and motivates the need for a theory of paradigmatic cases. In the second chapter, I introduce three characteristic features of paradigmatic cases as revealed in the particular case of the Mitt Romney campaign's self-deception during the 2012 presidential election. Next, the third chapter explores how paradigmatic cases of self-deception are plausibly intentional, drawing on the empirical literature on attention and mindfulness meditation to argue that in paradigmatic cases self-deceivers make sophisticated use of attentional capacities to sustain their false beliefs and that the intentions under which these capacities are deployed are relevant to self-deception in a way that makes the overall activity of self-deception intentional. Finally, in the last chapter I claim that paradigmatic cases involve culpable ignorance, which I reduce to a kind of negligence: because the paradigmatically self-deceived are negligent, we can hold them morally responsible."],"dc:identifier":["https://doi.org/10.7936/K7R78CBJ","https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/459"],"dc:language":["English (en)"],"dc:rights":["I have not registered my thesis with the U.S. Copyright Office, and do not intend to."],"dc:subject":["attention","intention","moral responsibility","negligence","self-deception","Philosophy"],"dc:title":["Paradigmatic Self-Deception"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy","Graduate School of Arts and Sciences"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:12:08Z"}