{"id":{"repo_id":"wlv","oai_identifier":"oai:wlv.openrepository.com:2436/620683"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/wlv/oai:wlv.openrepository.com:2436/620683","repository":{"repo_id":"wlv","name":"University of Wolverhampton","base_url":"https://wlv.openrepository.com/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The evolution of British tactical and operational tank doctrine and training in the First World War","abstract":"Tanks were first used in action in September 1916. There had been no previous combat experience on which to base tactical and operational doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited. Despite mechanical limitations of the early machines and their vulnerability to adverse ground conditions, the tanks achieved moderate success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank. Two years later, tanks had gained the support of most senior commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved both within the Tank Corps and at GHQ and higher command. Despite dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to ground conditions and enemy counter-measures. Competing demands for materiel meant there were never enough tanks to replace casualties and meet the demands of formation commanders. This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right time to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battles of the ‘Hundred Days’.","abstract_html":"Tanks were first used in action in September 1916. There had been no previous combat experience on which to base tactical and operational doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited. Despite mechanical limitations of the early machines and their vulnerability to adverse ground conditions, the tanks achieved moderate success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank. Two years later, tanks had gained the support of most senior commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved both within the Tank Corps and at GHQ and higher command. Despite dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to ground conditions and enemy counter-measures. Competing demands for materiel meant there were never enough tanks to replace casualties and meet the demands of formation commanders. This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right time to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battles of the ‘Hundred Days’.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["VENTHAM, PHILIP RICHARD"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016","date_published":"2016","updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:10:16Z","subjects":["British","tanks","doctrine","training","First World War","Swinton","Fuller","Wilson"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://wlv.dspace7.openrepository.com/bitstreams/422eca67-3619-4799-97e8-2df870079590/download"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["VENTHAM, PHILIP RICHARD"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2016"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2436/620683"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis or dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["British","tanks","doctrine","training","First World War","Swinton","Fuller","Wilson"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://wlv.dspace7.openrepository.com/bitstreams/422eca67-3619-4799-97e8-2df870079590/download"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://wlv.dspace7.openrepository.com/bitstreams/6efc21c0-0bc7-45e8-b9bc-ff65f31fa851/download"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Tanks were first used in action in September 1916. There had been no previous combat experience on which to base tactical and operational doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited. Despite mechanical limitations of the early machines and their vulnerability to adverse ground conditions, the tanks achieved moderate success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank. Two years later, tanks had gained the support of most senior commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved both within the Tank Corps and at GHQ and higher command. Despite dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to ground conditions and enemy counter-measures. Competing demands for materiel meant there were never enough tanks to replace casualties and meet the demands of formation commanders. This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right time to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battles of the ‘Hundred Days’."]},{"key":"dc:format.checksum.md5","label":"Dc Format Checksum Md5","values":["b8545643fee7f7de3626d18a079b8942","2839061421dcf0f761306239e6630274","a38625de4741cceed7f09bc4ae8ef2c5"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The evolution of British tactical and operational tank doctrine and training in the First World War"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["VENTHAM, PHILIP RICHARD"],"dc:date.issued":["2016"],"dc:description.abstract":["Tanks were first used in action in September 1916. There had been no previous combat experience on which to base tactical and operational doctrine for the employment of this novel weapon of war. Training of crews and commanders was hampered by lack of vehicles and weapons. Time was short in which to train novice crews. Training facilities were limited. Despite mechanical limitations of the early machines and their vulnerability to adverse ground conditions, the tanks achieved moderate success in their initial actions. Advocates of the tanks, such as Fuller and Elles, worked hard to convince the sceptical of the value of the tank. Two years later, tanks had gained the support of most senior commanders. Doctrine, based on practical combat experience, had evolved both within the Tank Corps and at GHQ and higher command. Despite dramatic improvements in the design, functionality and reliability of the later marks of heavy and medium tanks, they still remained slow and vulnerable to ground conditions and enemy counter-measures. Competing demands for materiel meant there were never enough tanks to replace casualties and meet the demands of formation commanders. This thesis will argue that the somewhat patchy performance of the armoured vehicles in the final months of the war was less a product of poor doctrinal guidance and inadequate training than of an insufficiency of tanks and the difficulties of providing enough tanks in the right locations at the right time to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battles of the ‘Hundred Days’."],"dc:format.checksum.md5":["b8545643fee7f7de3626d18a079b8942","2839061421dcf0f761306239e6630274","a38625de4741cceed7f09bc4ae8ef2c5"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://wlv.dspace7.openrepository.com/bitstreams/6efc21c0-0bc7-45e8-b9bc-ff65f31fa851/download"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["http://hdl.handle.net/2436/620683"],"dc:rights":["https://wlv.dspace7.openrepository.com/bitstreams/422eca67-3619-4799-97e8-2df870079590/download"],"dc:subject":["British","tanks","doctrine","training","First World War","Swinton","Fuller","Wilson"],"dc:title":["The evolution of British tactical and operational tank doctrine and training in the First World War"],"dc:type":["Thesis or dissertation"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T06:10:16Z"}