{"id":{"repo_id":"windsor","oai_identifier":"oai:uwindsor.scholaris.ca:20.500.14776/8019"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/windsor/oai:uwindsor.scholaris.ca:20.500.14776/8019","repository":{"repo_id":"windsor","name":"University of Windsor","base_url":"https://uwindsor.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Coherent Inclusivity Through Accessibility: Exploring the Application of Life-Value Ethics to Disability","abstract":"This project takes a comprehensive approach to the application of life-value ethics to matters of disability. I overview the philosophical foundation of my approach, life-value ethics, in its different dimensions. I explore the distinction between life-requirements and need-satisfiers. Life-requirements are the fundamental needs shared by all human being whereas need-satisfiers are the tools by which we access our life-requirements in specific circumstances. After exploring this philosophical groundwork, I address the social, medical, and value-neutral models of disability. I support a synthesis of the social and medical models of disability, but I believe that Elizabeth Barnes's value-neutral model in its rejection of the idea that being disabled is necessarily bad helps to overcome the medicalized belief that the only way to fully realize life-value is to eliminate disability. Hence, it is primarily the value-neutral model that I use to show how a life-value approach can address matters of accessibility and accommodation. As a way of demonstrating the merits of a life-value approach, I apply life-value ethics to the recent policies banning single-use plastic straws. Even though plastic straws do not represent the biggest threat to the environment, they are a primary target of environmentalist initiatives to reduce the amount of plastic waste entering our oceans. It can be shown that plastic straws act as need-satisfiers for disabled people with neurological and muscular impairments. In addition, I contend that by using the concept of coherent inclusivity, we can show that making these need-satisfiers accessible to the public will not only avoid causing harm, but will also help to provide alternative need-satisfiers to our ageing population.","abstract_html":"This project takes a comprehensive approach to the application of life-value ethics to matters of disability. I overview the philosophical foundation of my approach, life-value ethics, in its different dimensions. I explore the distinction between life-requirements and need-satisfiers. Life-requirements are the fundamental needs shared by all human being whereas need-satisfiers are the tools by which we access our life-requirements in specific circumstances. After exploring this philosophical groundwork, I address the social, medical, and value-neutral models of disability. I support a synthesis of the social and medical models of disability, but I believe that Elizabeth Barnes's value-neutral model in its rejection of the idea that being disabled is necessarily bad helps to overcome the medicalized belief that the only way to fully realize life-value is to eliminate disability. Hence, it is primarily the value-neutral model that I use to show how a life-value approach can address matters of accessibility and accommodation. As a way of demonstrating the merits of a life-value approach, I apply life-value ethics to the recent policies banning single-use plastic straws. Even though plastic straws do not represent the biggest threat to the environment, they are a primary target of environmentalist initiatives to reduce the amount of plastic waste entering our oceans. It can be shown that plastic straws act as need-satisfiers for disabled people with neurological and muscular impairments. In addition, I contend that by using the concept of coherent inclusivity, we can show that making these need-satisfiers accessible to the public will not only avoid causing harm, but will also help to provide alternative need-satisfiers to our ageing population.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dobson, Emily"],"institution":"University of Windsor","degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["mita@uwindsor.ca"],"advisors":["Jeff Noonan"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-01-01","date_published":"2019-01-01","updated_at":"2026-07-27T22:04:59Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en_CA"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14776/8019","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["mita@uwindsor.ca"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Jeff Noonan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dobson, Emily"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2025-07-03 14:05"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-06-20 20:22","2025-07-03T18:05:58Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2019-01-01"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.A."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Windsor"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_CA"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14776/8019"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This project takes a comprehensive approach to the application of life-value ethics to matters of disability. I overview the philosophical foundation of my approach, life-value ethics, in its different dimensions. I explore the distinction between life-requirements and need-satisfiers. Life-requirements are the fundamental needs shared by all human being whereas need-satisfiers are the tools by which we access our life-requirements in specific circumstances. After exploring this philosophical groundwork, I address the social, medical, and value-neutral models of disability. I support a synthesis of the social and medical models of disability, but I believe that Elizabeth Barnes's value-neutral model in its rejection of the idea that being disabled is necessarily bad helps to overcome the medicalized belief that the only way to fully realize life-value is to eliminate disability. Hence, it is primarily the value-neutral model that I use to show how a life-value approach can address matters of accessibility and accommodation. As a way of demonstrating the merits of a life-value approach, I apply life-value ethics to the recent policies banning single-use plastic straws. Even though plastic straws do not represent the biggest threat to the environment, they are a primary target of environmentalist initiatives to reduce the amount of plastic waste entering our oceans. It can be shown that plastic straws act as need-satisfiers for disabled people with neurological and muscular impairments. In addition, I contend that by using the concept of coherent inclusivity, we can show that making these need-satisfiers accessible to the public will not only avoid causing harm, but will also help to provide alternative need-satisfiers to our ageing population."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Coherent Inclusivity Through Accessibility: Exploring the Application of Life-Value Ethics to Disability"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["mita@uwindsor.ca"],"dc:contributor.advisor":["Jeff Noonan"],"dc:creator":["Dobson, Emily"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2025-07-03 14:05"],"dc:date.available":["2019-06-20 20:22","2025-07-03T18:05:58Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019-01-01"],"dc:description.abstract":["This project takes a comprehensive approach to the application of life-value ethics to matters of disability. I overview the philosophical foundation of my approach, life-value ethics, in its different dimensions. I explore the distinction between life-requirements and need-satisfiers. Life-requirements are the fundamental needs shared by all human being whereas need-satisfiers are the tools by which we access our life-requirements in specific circumstances. After exploring this philosophical groundwork, I address the social, medical, and value-neutral models of disability. I support a synthesis of the social and medical models of disability, but I believe that Elizabeth Barnes's value-neutral model in its rejection of the idea that being disabled is necessarily bad helps to overcome the medicalized belief that the only way to fully realize life-value is to eliminate disability. Hence, it is primarily the value-neutral model that I use to show how a life-value approach can address matters of accessibility and accommodation. As a way of demonstrating the merits of a life-value approach, I apply life-value ethics to the recent policies banning single-use plastic straws. Even though plastic straws do not represent the biggest threat to the environment, they are a primary target of environmentalist initiatives to reduce the amount of plastic waste entering our oceans. It can be shown that plastic straws act as need-satisfiers for disabled people with neurological and muscular impairments. In addition, I contend that by using the concept of coherent inclusivity, we can show that making these need-satisfiers accessible to the public will not only avoid causing harm, but will also help to provide alternative need-satisfiers to our ageing population."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14776/8019"],"dc:language.iso":["en_CA"],"dc:rights":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"],"dc:title":["Coherent Inclusivity Through Accessibility: Exploring the Application of Life-Value Ethics to Disability"],"dc:type":["info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Windsor"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T22:04:59Z"}