Performance Analysis of Cyber Deception Using Probabilistic Models

With the recent development of cyber-crime and cyber-warefare, new techniques for thwarting cyber attackers are required. Deception is the a mechanism that at- tempts to distort or misled an adversary. It is a proven tactic leveraged in traditional warfare with a long history of noted successes. While deception has seen great success in traditional warfare, it has seen little use within the cyber security realm. Further- more, there is very little demonstrated modeling of such defenses in terms of attackers success. This thesis establishes a novel urn-modeling technique for providing the prob- ability of success for an attacker in two different network deception defenses, network address shuffling and honeypots. This work goes on to analyze these models in two scenarios, gaining a foothold and minimum to win, providing insight into the effect both defenses can have under various environments. Finally, this thesis performs an empirical analysis of network address shuffling to provide a cost-benefit analysis regarding attack success and the effect on legitimate network users.

Grantor dc:publisher

Wake Forest University

Year dc:date.issued

2012

Author dc:creator

• Crouse, Michael

• deception

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10339/37258

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:wakespace.lib.wfu.edu:10339/37258