{"id":{"repo_id":"wayne-thes","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.wayne.edu:oa_dissertations-1829"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/wayne-thes/oai:digitalcommons.wayne.edu:oa_dissertations-1829","repository":{"repo_id":"wayne-thes","name":"Wayne State University","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Opacity Of Discrete Event Systems: Analysis And Control","abstract":"<p>The exchange of sensitive information in many systems over a network can be manipulated</p> <p>by unauthorized access. Opacity is a property to investigate security and</p> <p>privacy problems in such systems. Opacity characterizes whether a secret information</p> <p>of a system can be inferred by an unauthorized user. One approach to verify security</p> <p>and privacy properties using opacity problem is to model the system that may leak confidential</p> <p>information as a discrete event system. The problem that has not investigated</p> <p>intensively is the enforcement of opacity properties by supervisory control. In other</p> <p>words, constructing a minimally restrictive supervisor to limit the system's behavior so</p> <p>an unauthorized user cannot discover or infer the secret information.</p> <p>We describe and analyze the complexity of opacity in systems that are modeled as</p> <p>a discrete event system with partial observation mapping. We define three types of</p> <p>opacity: strong opacity, weak opacity, and no opacity. Strong Opacity describes the</p> <p>inability for the system's observer to know what happened in a system. On the other</p> <p>hand, No-opacity refers to the condition where there is no ambiguity in the system</p> <p>behavior. The definitions introduce properties of opacity and its effects on the system</p> <p>behavior. Strong opacity can be used to study security related problems while no opacity</p> <p>can be used to study fault, detection and diagnosis, among many other applications. In</p> <p>this dissertation, we investigate the largest opaque sublanguages and smallest opaque</p> <p>superlanguages of a language if the language is not opaque. We studied how to ensure</p> <p>strong opacity, weak opacity and no opacity by supervisory control. If strong opacity,</p> <p>weak opacity or no opacity is not satisfied, then we can restrict the system's behavior by a</p> <p>supervisor so that strong opacity, weak opacity or no opacity is satisfied. We investigate</p> <p>the strong opacity control problem (SOCP), the weak opacity control problem (WOCP),</p> <p>and no opacity control problem (NOCP).</p> <p>As illustrated by examples in the dissertation, the above properties of opacity can</p> <p>be used to characterize the security requirements in many applications, as anonymity</p> <p>requirements in protocols for web browsing. Solutions to SOCP in terms of the largest</p> <p>sublanguage that is controllable, observable (or normal), and strongly opaque were characterized.</p> <p>Similar characterization is available for solutions to NOCP.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;The exchange of sensitive information in many systems over a network can be manipulated&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;by unauthorized access. Opacity is a property to investigate security and&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;privacy problems in such systems. Opacity characterizes whether a secret information&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;of a system can be inferred by an unauthorized user. One approach to verify security&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;and privacy properties using opacity problem is to model the system that may leak confidential&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;information as a discrete event system. The problem that has not investigated&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;intensively is the enforcement of opacity properties by supervisory control. In other&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;words, constructing a minimally restrictive supervisor to limit the system&#x27;s behavior so&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;an unauthorized user cannot discover or infer the secret information.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;We describe and analyze the complexity of opacity in systems that are modeled as&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;a discrete event system with partial observation mapping. We define three types of&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;opacity: strong opacity, weak opacity, and no opacity. Strong Opacity describes the&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;inability for the system&#x27;s observer to know what happened in a system. On the other&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;hand, No-opacity refers to the condition where there is no ambiguity in the system&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;behavior. The definitions introduce properties of opacity and its effects on the system&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;behavior. Strong opacity can be used to study security related problems while no opacity&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;can be used to study fault, detection and diagnosis, among many other applications. In&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;this dissertation, we investigate the largest opaque sublanguages and smallest opaque&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;superlanguages of a language if the language is not opaque. We studied how to ensure&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;strong opacity, weak opacity and no opacity by supervisory control. If strong opacity,&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;weak opacity or no opacity is not satisfied, then we can restrict the system&#x27;s behavior by a&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;supervisor so that strong opacity, weak opacity or no opacity is satisfied. We investigate&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;the strong opacity control problem (SOCP), the weak opacity control problem (WOCP),&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;and no opacity control problem (NOCP).&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;As illustrated by examples in the dissertation, the above properties of opacity can&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;be used to characterize the security requirements in many applications, as anonymity&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;requirements in protocols for web browsing. Solutions to SOCP in terms of the largest&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;sublanguage that is controllable, observable (or normal), and strongly opaque were characterized.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Similar characterization is available for solutions to NOCP.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ben Kalefa, Majed Mohamed"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Open Access Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Electrical and Computer Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Feng Lin"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2013-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:59:33Z","subjects":["discrete event system","opacity","security","Computer Sciences","Electrical and Computer Engineering"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/830","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Feng Lin"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ben Kalefa, Majed Mohamed"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2013-01-01T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical and Computer Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Open Access Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["discrete event system","opacity","security","Computer Sciences","Electrical and Computer Engineering"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/830"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>The exchange of sensitive information in many systems over a network can be manipulated</p> <p>by unauthorized access. Opacity is a property to investigate security and</p> <p>privacy problems in such systems. Opacity characterizes whether a secret information</p> <p>of a system can be inferred by an unauthorized user. One approach to verify security</p> <p>and privacy properties using opacity problem is to model the system that may leak confidential</p> <p>information as a discrete event system. The problem that has not investigated</p> <p>intensively is the enforcement of opacity properties by supervisory control. In other</p> <p>words, constructing a minimally restrictive supervisor to limit the system's behavior so</p> <p>an unauthorized user cannot discover or infer the secret information.</p> <p>We describe and analyze the complexity of opacity in systems that are modeled as</p> <p>a discrete event system with partial observation mapping. We define three types of</p> <p>opacity: strong opacity, weak opacity, and no opacity. Strong Opacity describes the</p> <p>inability for the system's observer to know what happened in a system. On the other</p> <p>hand, No-opacity refers to the condition where there is no ambiguity in the system</p> <p>behavior. The definitions introduce properties of opacity and its effects on the system</p> <p>behavior. Strong opacity can be used to study security related problems while no opacity</p> <p>can be used to study fault, detection and diagnosis, among many other applications. In</p> <p>this dissertation, we investigate the largest opaque sublanguages and smallest opaque</p> <p>superlanguages of a language if the language is not opaque. We studied how to ensure</p> <p>strong opacity, weak opacity and no opacity by supervisory control. If strong opacity,</p> <p>weak opacity or no opacity is not satisfied, then we can restrict the system's behavior by a</p> <p>supervisor so that strong opacity, weak opacity or no opacity is satisfied. We investigate</p> <p>the strong opacity control problem (SOCP), the weak opacity control problem (WOCP),</p> <p>and no opacity control problem (NOCP).</p> <p>As illustrated by examples in the dissertation, the above properties of opacity can</p> <p>be used to characterize the security requirements in many applications, as anonymity</p> <p>requirements in protocols for web browsing. Solutions to SOCP in terms of the largest</p> <p>sublanguage that is controllable, observable (or normal), and strongly opaque were characterized.</p> <p>Similar characterization is available for solutions to NOCP.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Opacity Of Discrete Event Systems: Analysis And Control"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Feng Lin"],"dc:creator":["Ben Kalefa, Majed Mohamed"],"dc:date.available":["2013-01-01T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>The exchange of sensitive information in many systems over a network can be manipulated</p> <p>by unauthorized access. Opacity is a property to investigate security and</p> <p>privacy problems in such systems. Opacity characterizes whether a secret information</p> <p>of a system can be inferred by an unauthorized user. One approach to verify security</p> <p>and privacy properties using opacity problem is to model the system that may leak confidential</p> <p>information as a discrete event system. The problem that has not investigated</p> <p>intensively is the enforcement of opacity properties by supervisory control. In other</p> <p>words, constructing a minimally restrictive supervisor to limit the system's behavior so</p> <p>an unauthorized user cannot discover or infer the secret information.</p> <p>We describe and analyze the complexity of opacity in systems that are modeled as</p> <p>a discrete event system with partial observation mapping. We define three types of</p> <p>opacity: strong opacity, weak opacity, and no opacity. Strong Opacity describes the</p> <p>inability for the system's observer to know what happened in a system. On the other</p> <p>hand, No-opacity refers to the condition where there is no ambiguity in the system</p> <p>behavior. The definitions introduce properties of opacity and its effects on the system</p> <p>behavior. Strong opacity can be used to study security related problems while no opacity</p> <p>can be used to study fault, detection and diagnosis, among many other applications. In</p> <p>this dissertation, we investigate the largest opaque sublanguages and smallest opaque</p> <p>superlanguages of a language if the language is not opaque. We studied how to ensure</p> <p>strong opacity, weak opacity and no opacity by supervisory control. If strong opacity,</p> <p>weak opacity or no opacity is not satisfied, then we can restrict the system's behavior by a</p> <p>supervisor so that strong opacity, weak opacity or no opacity is satisfied. We investigate</p> <p>the strong opacity control problem (SOCP), the weak opacity control problem (WOCP),</p> <p>and no opacity control problem (NOCP).</p> <p>As illustrated by examples in the dissertation, the above properties of opacity can</p> <p>be used to characterize the security requirements in many applications, as anonymity</p> <p>requirements in protocols for web browsing. Solutions to SOCP in terms of the largest</p> <p>sublanguage that is controllable, observable (or normal), and strongly opaque were characterized.</p> <p>Similar characterization is available for solutions to NOCP.</p>"],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/830"],"dc:subject":["discrete event system","opacity","security","Computer Sciences","Electrical and Computer Engineering"],"dc:title":["Opacity Of Discrete Event Systems: Analysis And Control"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical and Computer Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Open Access Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:59:33Z"}