{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/9775"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/9775","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Rorty, Davidson, and Metaphor","abstract":"In his essay \"What Metaphors Mean,\" Donald Davidson gave a striking view of metaphor, claiming that metaphorical utterances have no meaning beyond the literal meanings of the words contained in them. Richard Rorty claims that this view of metaphor can be used to argue that cultural, moral, and scientific change (all products of metaphor) are contingent. I will argue that Davidson's view of metaphor is not consistent with Davidson's overall principles of theory construction, and, hence, is not consistent with his theory of linguistic meaning. Furthermore, I will argue that Rorty himself has significantly misinterpreted Davidson's theory of metaphor.","abstract_html":"In his essay &quot;What Metaphors Mean,&quot; Donald Davidson gave a striking view of metaphor, claiming that metaphorical utterances have no meaning beyond the literal meanings of the words contained in them. Richard Rorty claims that this view of metaphor can be used to argue that cultural, moral, and scientific change (all products of metaphor) are contingent. I will argue that Davidson&#x27;s view of metaphor is not consistent with Davidson&#x27;s overall principles of theory construction, and, hence, is not consistent with his theory of linguistic meaning. Furthermore, I will argue that Rorty himself has significantly misinterpreted Davidson&#x27;s theory of metaphor.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Mulberry, Greig R."],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Christman, John P."],"committee_members":["Hardcastle, Gary L.","Pitt, Joseph C."],"year":2004,"date_issued":"2004-03-24","date_published":"2004-03-24","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:19:42Z","subjects":["Metaphor","Meaning","Davidson","Rorty"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-8597-111048"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd-8597-111048","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9775","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Christman, John P."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Hardcastle, Gary L.","Pitt, Joseph C."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Mulberry, Greig R."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2011-08-06T14:48:18Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2011-08-06T14:48:18Z","1998-09-05"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2004-03-24"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Metaphor","Meaning","Davidson","Rorty"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-8597-111048"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9775"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In his essay \"What Metaphors Mean,\" Donald Davidson gave a striking view of metaphor, claiming that metaphorical utterances have no meaning beyond the literal meanings of the words contained in them. Richard Rorty claims that this view of metaphor can be used to argue that cultural, moral, and scientific change (all products of metaphor) are contingent. I will argue that Davidson's view of metaphor is not consistent with Davidson's overall principles of theory construction, and, hence, is not consistent with his theory of linguistic meaning. Furthermore, I will argue that Rorty himself has significantly misinterpreted Davidson's theory of metaphor."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Rorty, Davidson, and Metaphor"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Christman, John P."],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Hardcastle, Gary L.","Pitt, Joseph C."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Mulberry, Greig R."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2011-08-06T14:48:18Z"],"dc:date.available":["2011-08-06T14:48:18Z","1998-09-05"],"dc:date.issued":["2004-03-24"],"dc:description.abstract":["In his essay \"What Metaphors Mean,\" Donald Davidson gave a striking view of metaphor, claiming that metaphorical utterances have no meaning beyond the literal meanings of the words contained in them. Richard Rorty claims that this view of metaphor can be used to argue that cultural, moral, and scientific change (all products of metaphor) are contingent. I will argue that Davidson's view of metaphor is not consistent with Davidson's overall principles of theory construction, and, hence, is not consistent with his theory of linguistic meaning. 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