Architecture Support for Countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis and Fault Attack

The cryptographic algorithms are designed to be mathematically secure; however, side-channel analysis attacks go beyond mathematics by taking measurements of the device’s electrical activity to reveal the secret data of a cipher. These attacks also go hand in hand with fault analysis techniques to disclose the secret key used in cryptographic ciphers with even fewer measurements. This is of practical concern due to the ubiquity of embedded systems that allow physical access to the adversary such as smart cards, ATMs, etc.. Researchers through the years have come up with techniques to block physical attacks to the hardware or make such attacks less likely to succeed. Most of the conducted research consider one or the other of side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks whereas, in a real setting, the adversary can simultaneously take advantage of both to retrieve the secret data with less effort. Furthermore, very little work considers a software implementation of these ciphers although, with the availability of small and affordable or free microarchitectures, and flexibility and simplicity of software implementations, it is at times more practical to have a software implementation of ciphers instead of dedicated hardware chips. In this project, we come up with a modular presentation, suitable for software implementation of ciphers, to allow having simultaneous resistance against side-channel and fault analysis attacks. We also present an extension at the microarchitecture level to make our proposed countermeasures more intact and efficient.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.S.

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Computer Engineering

Department dc:contributor.department

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

2019

Author dc:creator

• Kiaei, Pantea

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Schaumont, Patrick R.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Nazhandali, Leyla
• Hsiao, Michael S.

• Side-channel attacks
• Fault attacks
• Custom-instruction extensions
• Bitslicing
• Software countermeasures

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Language dc:language.iso

en

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/10919/93537

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/93537