Back to results

Virginia Tech

Hardware Fault Attack Detection Methods for Secure Embedded Systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In our daily life, we are increasingly putting our trust in embedded software applications, which run on a range of processor-based embedded systems from smartcards to pay-TV units. This trend expands the threat model of embedded applications from software into hardware. Over the last 20 years, fault attacks have emerged as an important class of hardware attacks against embedded software security. In fault attacks, an adversary breaks the security by injecting well chosen, targeted faults during the execution of embedded software, and systematically analyzing softwares fault response. In this work, we propose cycle-accurate and fully digital techniques that can efficiently detect different types of fault attacks. The detection methods are low-cost regarding the area and power consumption and can be easily implemented using the standard cell based VLSI design flow. In addition to the architecture of the detectors, we present a detailed analysis of the design considerations that affect the cost and accuracy of the detectors. The functionality of the detectors is validated by implementing on ASIC and FPGA platforms (Spartan-6, Cyclone IV). Additionally, the proposed detection methods have demonstrated to successfully detect all of the injected faults without any false alarm.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Engineering
Department dc:contributor.department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Tech
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Deshpande, Chinmay Ravindra
Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
  • Nazhandali, Leyla
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Schaumont, Patrick R.
  • Zeng, Haibo

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
vt_gsexam:13151
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/82141

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Deshpande, Chinmay Ravindra. Hardware Fault Attack Detection Methods for Secure Embedded Systems. masters thesis, Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82141